Political Propaganda Techniques

CNN [excerpt]: According to a report by Stockholm University’s Varieties of Democracy Project, published in March this year, #Taiwan for the 10th consecutive year received the greatest amount of #disinformation from outside its borders, highlighting the need for effective fact-checking mechanisms on the island. A growing security risk Disinformation is something Taiwan’s security agencies are particularly alert to. At a recent closed-door security briefing attended by CNN, Taiwan’s intelligence community warned that #China has been working to influence Taiwan’s upcoming #election through a series of disinformation, military and economic operations, with the goal of boosting the chances of opposition candidates who favor improving ties with Beijing. According to Taiwanese intelligence, Wang Huning, the fourth-ranking leader in th Chinese Communist Party, recently convened a meeting to coordinate efforts to influence the election, while reducing the likelihood that external parties could find evidence of such interference. “They hope that the party they dislike will lose the election,” a senior Taiwanese security official, referring to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which views Taiwan as a de facto sovereign nation and has prioritized elevating Taipei’s ties with Western powers since taking office in 2016. The candidate for DPP, Vice President Lai Ching-te, is currently leading in the polls, and is openly loathed by Chinese officials. Lai is ahead of two other candidates – Hou Yu-ih from the Kuomintang party and Ko Wen-je from the Taiwan People’s Party – who are seen as favoring closer relations with Beijing. Among the different strategies deployed by Beijing, Taiwan believes China’s cognitive warfare operations – which included spreading disinformation in Taiwan and magnifying talking points that favor China-friendly candidates – are the most sophisticated, multiple officials said at a closed-door briefing on security affairs attended by CNN. Besides operating content farms and fake accounts on #socialmedia, the officials alleged that China’s information operations are multifaceted. Other tactics used by Beijing included working with private companies to impersonate genuine #news websites, handpicking soundbites that fit Beijing’s narratives from Taiwanese television programs and repackaging them into short social media videos, and illicitly funding small news organizations in Taiwan that mostly report on local livelihood issues but also occasionally post content that cast doubts toward candidates unfavorable to Beijing. ...Besides spreading rumors, Beijing has also been exerting pressure on Taiwanese businesses with investments in mainland China to toe the partyline, and luring Taiwanese politicians with discounted trips to mainland cities in an attempt to generate support for candidates lobbying for closer ties to Beijing, the officials claimed. #geopolitics

No one has more experience with #Russian #InformationWarfare than #Ukraine. Means for us: Time to listen & learn! The #CenterforCounteringDisinformation and #EUAM published an extensive report on mechanisms, tactics and tools of Russian #InfoWarfare. Here is what counts: Mechanisms: -> These are the "underlying processes that enable information warfare to function" and include how falsehoods are spread, beliefs are influenced, and trust is eroded." Mechanisms are psychological, cognitive, and systemic, targeting the human perception of truth and authority. The report identifies 16 mechanisms (e.g. #Bots, #FakeAccounts, #Deepfakes, #Framing and Information overload) Examples: - Narrative Priming: Repeated exposure to a certain narrative (e.g., “Ukraine is run by Nazis”) conditions the audience to accept it over time. - Information Overload (Cognitive Fatigue): Flooding the public with conflicting messages (true, half-true, false) causes confusion and disengagement, making people more susceptible to manipulation. Tactics: -> The report identifies 19 tactics which it defines as "the operational techniques used to deploy these mechanisms, how specific goals are pursued in campaigns". These often involve exploiting digital platforms, hijacking social movements, or triggering emotional responses. Examples: - False Flag Operations: Fake accounts impersonating Ukrainian officials have posted defeatist messages or fake surrender announcements to demoralize citizens. - #Leaks: Hack-and-leak operations (e.g., email leaks from public officials) are timed and framed to cause political damage and fuel conspiracy theories. Tools of Information Warfare -> The report focuses on 10 soft power tools which are defined as "non-coercive instruments used to shape perceptions, build influence, and legitimize the strategic goals of an actor without using overt force." They blur the line between culture, diplomacy, and propaganda, serving as vehicles for subtle manipulation and appear benign or even beneficial, masking their role in advancing adversarial narratives or sowing distrust.   Examples: - International Broadcasters: #RT (Russia Today) and #Sputnik are named as primary instruments of Russian soft power. They package propaganda as journalism, targeting global audiences with framed stories that discredit the West or valorize Russia’s role. - Pseudo-NGOs and "Humanitarian" Fronts: Organizations claiming to support peace or democracy while functioning as fronts for influence operations. The report inherently confirms #genAI role in shaping Russian infowar: - AI-Generated Content: Deepfake videos impersonating Ukrainian leaders have been deployed to spread misinformation about capitulation or surrender. - Bot networks & fake accounts: AI is used to set up and automate accounts to amplify information - Overload & quantity: Info flooding is being carried out by using genAI both for content generation as well as spread, dissemination and scaling.

Russia is employing new tactics to spread disinformation in Scotland, now targeting small language communities through automated websites in minority languages. One recent example is the Pravda Alba website, which publishes fake news in Gaelic- a language spoken by only 1 in 40 Scots- to fuel ethnic tensions and discredit local politicians such as Scottish Labour leader Anas Sarwar. The site falsely claims, without evidence, that he is working to allow Pakistani Muslims to dictate what is taught in schools, among other racist and xenophobic insinuations: https://lnkd.in/dUdcYy3p. This campaign is part of a broader Russian strategy to destabilize Western democracies through disinformation, now using artificial intelligence for automated translation and mass dissemination of content in dozens of languages. The network of sites, bearing the name Pravda (“truth” in Russian), covers more than 80 countries and 130 different platforms, including those targeting Maori in New Zealand and Welsh speakers in the UK, and is already well-known to information operations and disinformation researchers. The goal is to flood the internet ecosystem with pro-Russian fake news so that even chatbots and search engines start reproducing these narratives as credible information. Experts note that the choice of small language communities is deliberate: disinformation spreads more easily where there is a lack of high-quality content in those languages, and automated translations allow for the rapid and cheap production of large volumes of material. The strategy also relies on the idea that even a small portion of the affected community might pass these false narratives on to the English-speaking majority. In the case of Pravda Alba, the content is machine-translated from Russian, often with grammatical and semantic errors, highlighting the campaign’s mass-produced rather than personalized nature. Although the site does not have a large audience, specialists warn that flooding the internet with such materials has a long-term effect, undermining trust in the media and making it easier for disinformation to penetrate automated systems and search engines. Russian disinformation operations in Scotland are not new. Moscow has previously attempted to influence public opinion through outlets like Sputnik, social media, and campaigns to sow distrust in institutions and societal division. What’s new is that, with the help of artificial intelligence, this strategy can now be applied even to the smallest linguistic and cultural communities, making it even harder to counter.

As Canadians prepare for the upcoming federal elections, it’s crucial to recognize the evolving tactics used by state actors to influence democratic processes. From deepfakes to AI-generated disinformation, these tools are being weaponized to distort facts, manipulate opinions, and undermine trust in our institutions. The findings of the Foreign Interference Commission have already highlighted tangible instances of interference in past elections. This is a stark reminder that such acts cannot be ruled out in the future. Here’s why it matters: 1. Deepfakes—hyper-realistic fake videos or audio—can mislead voters by fabricating statements or actions of political candidates. ( You would have seen a bunch of those videos popping up on your social media feeds lately) 2. AI-driven disinformation spreads rapidly, making it harder to distinguish between fact and fiction. 3. Coordinated campaigns by foreign actors aim to exploit divisions and sway public opinion. As citizens, we hold the power to safeguard our democracy. Here’s how: 1️⃣ Fact-check any news or claims about candidates before sharing or believing them. 2️⃣ Stay informed about the tools and tactics being used to manipulate information. 3️⃣ Vote wisely—make decisions based on verified facts, not fabricated narratives. Canada’s democracy is strong, but all of us must be vigilant. Let’s exercise our democratic rights responsibly and ensure that our elections reflect the true will of the people. Vote for Canada #Democracy #CanadaElections #FactCheck #AI #Deepfakes #ElectionIntegrity

How Elections Are Won in India: As a political consultant who has worked on three campaigns and closely with sitting and contesting MLAs/MPs, if I couldn’t answer this question, it would mean I’ve learned nothing. However, I do feel I’ve learned something. The significance of how good or bad a candidate is plays only a little role in determining the election outcome. The candidate's gender - whether male or female - holds very little significance. There is some relevance to how wealthy the candidate is. But the most important and decisive factor in the election outcome is “What’s the narrative on the ground?” 70% of people in the electorate would not recognize their MLA if he or she stood in front of them. However, they would definitely have some story about him or her in their minds. The candidate who can build a compelling story for themselves or a negative one for their opponent tends to emerge as the winner. For instance, in one assembly constituency I worked with—where I was strategizing for our sitting MLA—it was a challenging situation. The narrative built by our opponent was that he is always there for the people who reach out to him, while the MLA doesn’t help anyone. I had half a dozen people working on the ground, and they reported the same narrative being spread, but none could find anyone who had actually been helped by him. But narrative is narrative, and that’s where the power lies. It spreads like wildfire. And that favorable seat was won by us just by a whisker of 1400 votes. Lucky MLA! In another assembly constituency, our candidate lost the last election, even though he had a very good image among the electorate and that's what happened: Just three days before the voting, a celebrity politician's rally was scheduled and hyper advertisement was done in the constituency. The rally was scheduled for noon, and 10,000 people gathered by 11 AM and it was expected to be a jampacked event. They kept waiting until 3 PM, when the celebrity politician canceled the event because he had to celebrate his son's birthday. We lost that seat that year by a couple of thousand votes because those 10,000 people, frustrated and angry, returned to their villages and spread the narrative that this party is filled with arrogant leaders. What the opposition couldn’t achieve was done by our own leader. There’s more to discuss about narratives—perhaps another time. #politics #elections