Military Air Tactics

🇺🇦 Innovation Under Fire What’s happening off the coast of Ukraine should make every Western defence planner sit up. Ukrainian naval drones didn’t just adapt to a threat, they actually changed the behaviour of the enemy. Russian helicopters were once a critical counter to Ukraine’s maritime drones. They hunted them, disrupted them and controlled the battlespace. So Ukraine did something deceptively simple and strategically profound. They armed the drones with surface-to-air missiles. Result? Russian helicopters now avoid them entirely, recognising they’ve become easy targets. The so what? This isn’t about a new platform. It’s about innovation velocity beating legacy doctrine. Why this matters for future military strategy 👉 Drones are no longer disposable. These naval drones aren’t just ISR or kamikaze assets, they are multi-role, survivable, decision-shaping systems. Once a drone can credibly threaten manned aircraft, the cost-exchange ratio collapses in its favour. 👉 Behavioural deterrence beats attrition. Ukraine didn’t need to destroy every helicopter. It only needed to change Russian risk calculus. The real win wasn’t the kill, it was forcing the enemy to withdraw capability. 👉 Cross-domain convergence is the future. Sea platforms threatening air assets. Small systems dictating big-platform behaviour. This is the erosion of traditional domain boundaries, and it’s accelerating. 👉 Speed outperforms scale. This wasn’t a decade-long procurement programme. It was rapid iteration at the tactical edge, driven by operators, not committees. The side that learns fastest now wins first. 👉 Western militaries should be uncomfortable. If low-cost drones can deny helicopters today, what denies, • Amphibious landings tomorrow? • Carrier air operations next? • Littoral resupply routes in NATO theatres? Ukraine is stress-testing the future of warfare in real time, while much of the West is still debating requirements documents. This is innovation born of necessity, but it’s also a warning. The next military advantage won’t come from the biggest platforms or the longest programmes. It will come from, Fast thinkers, Fast builders and Fast learners. Those who ignore that lesson will find their helicopters and doctrines grounded. As ever, this isn’t doctrine, It’s a debate, and debate is how innovation starts. https://lnkd.in/eDBSstQ6 #Gwilly #DefenceInnovation #FutureWarfare #Drones #MilitaryStrategy #Ukraine #InnovationUnderFire

🛡️ 𝐍𝐨 𝐖𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞 𝐒𝐰𝐚𝐧 𝐢𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐠 — 𝐙𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐳𝐡𝐧𝐲𝐢 𝐨𝐧 𝐰𝐚𝐫, 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐯𝐚𝐥 🎙️ “This is a real war to exhaustion. A high-tech war for survival.” — General Valerii Zaluzhnyi At the forum “Export of Security: Ukrainian Technological Weapons in the World”, Zaluzhnyi delivered a stark message: there will be no miracle peace, no return to 1991 or 2022 without breaking Russia’s ability to wage war. 📦 On defense exports, Zaluzhnyi outlines 3 core dimensions: ▪️ A source of resources for survival and growth ▪️ A driver of innovation in military design and application ▪️ A strategic tool for integrating into future alliances through experience-sharing ⚔️ On the nature of modern war: ▪️ Ukraine cannot rely on manpower — it must win with low-cost, high-tech asymmetry ▪️ The only path forward is to break Russia’s military-economic engine ▪️ This means: – Making the cost of war unbearable for Russia – Undermining Russia’s scientific and social base – Continuing economic development in wartime, as Israel does 🧭 On Ukraine’s current challenges: ▪️ Limited R&D and coordination across key sectors (ISR, air defense, unmanned systems) ▪️ Ukraine is losing the innovation race in areas where it once led ▪️ No systematic approach to scaling, doctrine design, or organizational integration ▪️ Tech exports must go beyond hardware — they must include: – New weapons + new methods of employment – New doctrines, training models, and force structures – A redefinition of how we budget for security 🤝 On what must be done: ▪️ Build a national innovation-based survival policy ▪️ Forge international tech partnerships to co-develop, co-produce, and co-scale ▪️ Coordinate state, private sector, and civil society ▪️ Balance military urgency with economic sustainability “No weapon that’s effective now will remain effective tonight.” Zaluzhnyi’s message is clear: Ukraine must become a global exporter of defense thinking — not just defense hardware. This requires structure, speed, and statecraft. #Zaluzhnyi #Ukraine #DefenseInnovation #WarEconomy #SecurityExports #SurvivalStrategy #ISR #AirDefense #DoctrineDevelopment #MilitaryTransformation #TechSovereignty #DefenseIndustry #ModernWarfare

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, said a phrase that sounds quiet but carries significant weight: the possibility of a more assertive — even pre-emptive — response by the Alliance to Russian cyberattacks, sabotage, and airspace violations is no longer taboo. He acknowledges that NATO faces more ethical and legal constraints than an aggressor state, which makes defense more difficult. Yet at the same time, he hints that the Alliance is preparing to move away from its “traditional way of thinking.” This signal should be read on three levels. First, the Admiral is talking about a shift in understanding defense itself: from reactive to proactive. This implies actions that may precede the next attack if there is reason to believe it is imminent. Not escalation — but a refusal to remain a target. The second level is acknowledging the weak point of democracies. NATO cannot act the way Russia does. There are parliaments, courts, legal frameworks, and decision-making processes. This is a foundation, but also a brake. The adversary exploits it, striking in the grey zone where it is difficult to define a clear threshold for response. Dragone is essentially saying: we no longer want to be hostages to our own decency. The third level is a warning. Russia must understand that cable sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, or airspace violations will no longer be treated as minor incidents. The Alliance is preparing to view them as a phase of conflict, not as “inconveniences.” This is not a change of statute, but a change of mood — and in the West, mood often precedes policy. As for practical consequences, the most likely scenarios of such a “more assertive response” look measured but firm. They may include quickly neutralizing the sources of cyberattacks before they cause damage, or temporarily disabling the infrastructure from which hostile operations are conducted. Preventive actions in the air are also possible — from forced landings to interceptions with demonstrative escort. This also includes intelligence operations against sabotage groups on European territory — not after the fact, but during preparation. This does not look like a path to a direct war between NATO and Russia. It is rather an attempt to strip Moscow of the illusion that hybrid attacks will remain unpunished until they become catastrophic. The Alliance is tired of living in the mode of waiting for the next strike — and is finally saying so out loud.

Ukraine is the C-student, the U.S. is the straight-A student. But the U.S. must learn from Ukraine speed, cheap production, and asymmetric war. Michael Brown and Matt Kaplan write in Foreign Affairs that Washington must draw hard lessons from Ukraine to prepare for China. The U.S. bet on short wars and exquisite systems after 1991. Ukraine shows the opposite: wars are long, attritional, software-driven. Mass and adaptation beat prestige platforms. Ukraine started the war with one small warship. Russia had a fleet. Ukraine destroyed or disabled 25+ Russian ships — about one-third of the Black Sea Fleet — including the cruiser Moskva. Blockade broken and grain exports resumed. In spring 2025, Ukraine smuggled 117 FPV drones near five Russian airfields. Cost per drone: a few thousand dollars. Damage: up to 30% of Russia’s strategic bombers. Estimated cost to Moscow: $7 billion. Drone war now evolves in three-week cycles. Ukraine attacks. Russia jams. Ukraine adds computer vision. Russia expands jammers. Software updates decide survival within days, not years. Cheap drones — hundreds of dollars — replaced $100,000 Excalibur precision shells. Precision moved to small teams near the frontline. Scale replaced elegance. Contrast this with the U.S.: F-35 — 20 years development, $80m per jet. Ford-class carrier — $13bn. B-21 — in development since early 2010s. For the cost of one aircraft carrier, the Pentagon could buy 13 million drones — nearly 100 per U.S. infantryman. Yet only 20% of the $900bn defense budget goes to procurement. 17% goes to developing new exquisite platforms. China’s shipbuilding capacity is 200× that of the U.S. In a prolonged war, manufacturing wins. Quantity has a quality of its own. Imagine a Pacific conflict where satellites are jammed, carriers are targeted, logistics degrade, and drones swarm at scale. Would exquisite platforms survive attrition? Or would cheap, modular systems dominate? Brown and Kaplan argue: — War-game asymmetric threats seriously. — Rebuild stockpiles. — Invest in modular systems. — Use 3D printing and scalable drone production. — Design for replacement, not perfection. Russia planned a three-day war. It has lasted four years. The next conflict will not wait for 20-year procurement cycles. If you were the Pentagon, what would you build first — another carrier, or a factory that produces millions of drones?

Former CIA Director Petraeus: U.S. success in the Persian Gulf is a source of pride, but not a reason for complacency. Ukraine offers the key lessons: modern warfare involves drones, AI, and precision-strike capabilities. That is where the real challenges and the future of warfare lie. The battlefield in Ukraine is far more complex than the Persian Gulf. Drones are jammed, intercepted, and quickly replaced. This is a war on an industrial scale, where mass, resilience, and innovation are decisive. Without a conventional navy, Ukraine was able to use maritime drones to disable a significant portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and force it to retreat. Cheap unmanned systems can break traditional naval power. U.S. and Israeli operations in the Persian Gulf took place under much easier conditions, with control over communications and navigation. The enemy is unable to operate on a massive scale across all domains. Unlike in Ukraine, where a constant, large-scale, and adaptive war is underway. Lesson #1 — Volume is key. Ukraine produces them by the millions, up to 7 million a year. The U.S. doesn’t even come close to that scale. Lesson #2 — Speed of adaptation. The advantage goes to whoever learns faster. In Ukraine, drones are updated weekly, hardware every few weeks, and tactics change just as quickly. Lesson #3 — Resilience. Systems must operate under electronic warfare and without communication. This leads to autonomous drones and swarms capable of penetrating air defense systems. Even modern systems are already struggling; autonomous ones will pose an even greater challenge. The U.S. Army needs rapid and radical changes. New approaches must transform everything: from training to procurement. The U.S. demonstrated its strength in the Gulf; Ukraine is facing a real war under pressure. This should not lull us into complacency but rather heighten the sense of urgency. General David H. Petraeus, US Army (Ret.)

Part 6. Cyber before tanks — this is how Russia wages war. Long before missiles hit infrastructure or drones fill the sky, Russian services are already inside networks: government, power grids, logistics routes, satellites, banks, media. Ukraine has lived through this for a decade. Estonia did in 2007. Georgia did in 2008. Europe felt the shockwaves of NotPetya. NATO satellite links were targeted on day one of the invasion. This is not “IT disruption.” It is pre-invasion shaping operations. A doctrine where non-kinetic tools prepare the battlefield for kinetic assault. And it is happening right now across Europe — ports, energy, telecoms, critical infrastructure. Cyber is the first front. If we wait for tanks to appear, we are already late. Part 6: Cyber Before Tanks – Hybrid Doctrine in Action How Russia built this playbook. How Ukraine adapted. And what Europe must do — now. #NATO #CyberSecurity #HybridWarfare #Ukraine #Deterrence #CriticalInfrastructure #C2 #CyberDefense #InfoOps #Resilience

Ukraine Deploys All-Robot Drone Force to Defend Against 8,000 Russian Troops Overview: In a groundbreaking military operation, Ukraine’s 13th National Guard Brigade launched an all-robot, combined-arms drone attack against a significantly larger Russian force in Kharkiv Oblast. This marks one of the first recorded instances of an entirely robotic combat force being deployed in active warfare, blending aerial and ground-based drones to defend a critical five-mile frontline stretch against 8,000 Russian soldiers. The Ukrainian military’s innovative strategy highlights both the technological prowess of its drone warfare capabilities and the growing challenges of maintaining sufficient manpower in prolonged conflict. How the All-Robot Drone Team Operated: 1. Combined-Arms Coordination: • The drone team operated similarly to a traditional combined-arms military force, integrating surveillance, offense, and logistics roles. 2. Key Drone Units: • Multi-Rotor Copters: Equipped to carry heavy payloads, including anti-tank mines. • FPV (First-Person View) Drones: Used for precision strikes and kamikaze missions. • Surveillance Drones: Provided real-time intelligence and targeting data. 3. Tactical Deployment: • Dozens of unmanned ground and aerial vehicles coordinated simultaneously across a small frontline segment to disrupt Russian advances. National Guard Spokesperson: “This operation demonstrated the power of robotic synergy—ground and aerial drones working in tandem to secure key defensive positions.” Strategic and Technological Significance: 1. Force Multiplier: • Drones effectively compensated for Ukrainian manpower shortages on this section of the frontline. 2. Scalable Tactics: • The success of this operation suggests the potential for larger-scale drone deployments in future engagements. 3. Cost-Effective Defense: • Compared to traditional manned operations, drones are more cost-efficient and reduce the risk of human casualties. 4. Real-Time Adaptability: • Surveillance drones provided instant battlefield intelligence, enabling quick adjustments to enemy movements. Concerns Over Manpower Shortages: While the use of an all-robot drone force is a technological milestone, analysts caution that it might also signal strain on Ukrainian human resources: The Takeaway: Ukraine’s deployment of an all-robot drone force against 8,000 Russian troops represents a milestone in military innovation and a strategic adaptation to mounting human resource challenges. While the success of the operation demonstrates the immense potential of unmanned combat systems, it also highlights the fragility of Ukraine’s manpower reserves in a prolonged war. This development may set the stage for an intensified drone arms race, pushing both Ukraine and Russia to prioritize autonomous systems in future military planning. The Kharkiv operation could very well be remembered as a turning point in the evolution of modern warfare.

🎯 The latest combat footage from the Huliaipole direction highlights a recurring pattern on the modern battlefield in Ukraine: Russian forces attempting rapid follow-on assaults after an initial failed probe. In this case, elements of Russia’s 40th Naval Infantry Brigade attempted to exploit perceived momentum after a failed infantry attack by immediately returning with armored support—a tank, an APC, and ATVs carrying additional troops. However, Ukrainian defenders were ready. Operators from the 414th Separate UAV Brigade “Madyar’s Birds,” working alongside the 5th Assault Brigade and the 225th Assault Regiment, detected the column early along the Malynivka–Zelenyi Hai–Huliaipole route and coordinated strikes that halted the attack before it could achieve a breakthrough. The footage demonstrates how persistent ISR and drone-enabled targeting are fundamentally reshaping the tempo of ground combat. ⚡ The engagement also underscores the growing integration of unmanned systems across Ukrainian formations. Units like “Madyar’s Birds” have become central to Ukraine’s defensive architecture, providing real-time reconnaissance, target designation, and precision strikes against armored formations that once dominated maneuver warfare. Russian units continue to rely on traditional mechanized assaults, but repeated failures in sectors like Huliaipole demonstrate how vulnerable these tactics have become in a drone-saturated battlespace. Ukraine’s ability to detect, track, and destroy armored columns with relatively inexpensive systems reflects both innovation and adaptation under fire. Continued international support will remain critical to sustaining these capabilities and ensuring Ukraine can continue defending its sovereignty against Russia’s unprovoked invasion. 🇺🇦 #SlavaUkraini #StandWithUkraine #ArmUkraineNow #DeOppressoLiber

Norway could detect a Russian attack on NATO's Northern Flank almost immediately, but it might have to fend for itself alone–until reinforcements arrive. The alliance is taking steps to respond more rapidly. NATO and other allies are considering putting a drone base for long-range surveillance in northern Norway, where the U.S. military used to have turboprop surveillance planes, said Olsen, Norway’s former military representative to the alliance. NATO uses the air base at Bodo. The U.S. Marines have stored weapons, vehicles, and ammo in the Trondheim mountainsides since the 1980s. And the United States has been talking to the Norwegian government about reviving its use of Olavsvern, a secret Cold War naval base with dry docks big enough for six submarines burrowed into the mountainside. • MORE BASES • They’re looking at a more aggressive posture, which could also see U.S. troops go to Finnish and Swedish bases, too. But Nordic officials say they have already seen the Russian military rearrange itself after Finland and Sweden joined the alliance. The Kremlin emptied land forces from Murmansk and Kaliningrad. Still, the threat is thought to be in the medium term, not right now. “We don’t see Russian units coming over Finnish or Swedish borders as of now,” said Byden, the Swedish defense chief. Norway doesn’t, either. • RUSSIA RE-EMERGES • What European officials do see is a rapidly deteriorating security situation. Russia has the upper hand on the battlefield in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s military planners are already looking toward a longer-term conflict with an enlarged NATO. Byden cautioned that Russia could reconstitute forces in the Western Military District that borders NATO within three to five years. “This is just the beginning of this major military transformation,” said Katarzyna Zysk, a professor of international relations and contemporary history at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. “NATO may face a sort of Soviet-style mass army across the border over the next decade.” • A NEW THREAT • Russia is still focused on training new recruits for Ukraine, said Kristoffersen, Norway’s military chief. Russia has only about one-fifth of its land forces left on Nordic borders from before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Norwegian officials believe that Russia would use troops on the Kola Peninsula in any conflict. With NATO’s eyes on Russia along a much longer border, the allies would also be able to see the Kremlin massing troops quickly. “The supply lines run along the Finnish border, which is now NATO territory,” said Svein Efjestad, a former top Norwegian defense official who is now a senior advisor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. “The reinforcements they used to send to the Kola Peninsula come from Siberia, and much of this goes on rail, and it takes a long time. We have very good intelligence in the area. I think we will see this quite early.” (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jacquilyn Davis)