Maritime Security Risks in the Grey Zone

Check out the latest edition of the Systematic Defence Matters newsletter. This month, we take a deep dive into the subsurface battlespace, exploring how the latest innovations from SitaWare are helping to improve clarity for naval forces operating beneath the waves. https://lnkd.in/eabMVPRi Follow Systematic Defence for the latest news, insights, and activities in the defence sector. #SitaWare #Martime #AI #Interoperability #DefenceTechnology #Systematic

This is an interesting development and also a useful reminder of something that deserves more attention when we talk about regional security architectures. NATO is expanding surveillance and monitoring missions in the Arctic, drawing lessons from operations that have been used to counter Russian activities in the Baltic Sea region. The idea is simple: improve situational awareness, detect unusual activity early, and respond before incidents escalate. But this also highlights a broader challenge that we still struggle with in Europe. Situational awareness cannot be fragmented. The Baltic Sea is a very different operational environment compared to the Atlantic. It is geographically constrained, heavily trafficked, densely connected with critical infrastructure, and surrounded by multiple NATO and EU countries whose security is deeply interlinked. What happens in one part of the Baltic Sea rarely stays local. Which means the operational picture must also be regional. Breaking situational awareness into separate national perspectives or fragmented command structures creates blind spots. And blind spots in this environment are exactly what adversaries look for. This is why unified understanding of the full Baltic Sea region is so important. From Norway down through Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, Poland and Germany, the security environment is shared. Maritime activity, airspace monitoring, critical infrastructure protection, undersea cables, energy systems and logistics routes all intersect in the same operational space. If information flows slowly or remains siloed, the overall picture becomes incomplete. And the Baltic Sea region is precisely where threat levels are currently among the highest in Europe. This is also why collaboration must go beyond simply operating under the NATO umbrella. Real resilience requires practical cooperation between countries, institutions and command structures. It requires policies that enable rapid information sharing, shared situational awareness, and integrated responses. The danger of fragmented command arrangements is not theoretical. If the operational picture is split across different structures and responsibilities, coordination becomes slower exactly when speed matters most. And in a crisis, time is the most valuable resource. Building a shared situational awareness architecture across the Baltic Sea region supported by real data sharing, interoperable systems, and coordinated command structures is therefore not just an operational improvement. It is a prerequisite for credible deterrence. #BalticSeaSecurity #NATO #SituationalAwareness #EuropeanSecurity https://lnkd.in/dh9gUy9H

Defense communications and mission-systems company Ultra I&C announced that it’s sending its Archer troposcatter beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) comms system up to the Arctic for operational trials with the Canadian Armed Forces. https://lnkd.in/gf_AuXR9

German officials plan for a $11.6 billion military satellite network independent of a parallel European program. The effort is raising red flags among EU lawmakers over duplication problems, fragmentation of efforts, and high costs:

Armada International reports that EU has taken an important step forward to expand secure satellite communications bandwidth to its membership for military and government communications. "The EUGOVSATCOM initiative means that member states without sovereign SATCOM can access secure satellite communications without having to acquire their own satellites and constellations". https://lnkd.in/gyBxtDj2

OSINT REPORT — U.S. Seeks Three New Defense Sites in Greenland Source: Berlingske (via X post) Domain: Arctic Security • U.S.–Denmark Relations • Great‑Power Competition Reputational Risk: Medium --- 1. Core facts (as reported) - U.S. Northern Command chief Gen. Gregory Guillot told the U.S. Senate that the U.S. is quietly negotiating with Denmark to gain access to three additional defense areas in Greenland, beyond Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base). - Guillot described Denmark and Greenland as “highly cooperative”, stating that all U.S. requests are being accommodated and can be handled under the 1951 U.S.–Denmark defense agreement. - The specific locations were not named in the hearing, but a Danish defense expert, Marc Jacobsen, suggests three likely candidates: - Narsarsuaq (southern Greenland, deep‑water port) - Kangerlussuaq (southwestern Greenland, large‑aircraft‑capable runway) - A deep‑water port near Pituffik Space Base These are all historical U.S. military locations in Greenland. --- 2. Strategic significance Arctic and North Atlantic posture - Greenland sits at the intersection of North America, the Arctic, and the North Atlantic, making it critical for: - Early warning and missile defense - Strategic bomber and airlift routes - Submarine and surface naval access - Space and sensor infrastructure (Pituffik) Additional U.S. access points would: - Increase operational flexibility for air and maritime forces. - Strengthen logistics and sustainment for Arctic operations. - Enhance monitoring and deterrence vis‑à‑vis Russia in the High North. --- 3. Likely roles of the three candidate sites - Narsarsuaq (deep‑water port, South Greenland): - Potential hub for naval logistics, pre‑positioning, and resupply. - Useful for North Atlantic and GIUK‑gap–adjacent operations. - Kangerlussuaq (long runway, Southwest Greenland): - Ideal for large transport aircraft, tankers, and possibly bombers. - Could serve as a staging and diversion airfield for Arctic and transatlantic missions. - Deep‑water port near Pituffik: - Directly supports space, radar, and early‑warning infrastructure. - Enhances sea access to an already critical U.S. installation. Together, these sites would form a distributed Arctic support network. --- 4. Political and alliance context - Guillot’s remarks that everything fits under the 1951 defense agreement suggest: - No new treaty is required. - The U.S. is expanding within an existing legal and political framework. - Describing Denmark and Greenland as “highly cooperative” signals: - Alignment of strategic interests. - Low public friction, high behind‑the‑scenes coordination. This reduces overt political risk while still deepening U.S. presence. ---

German plans for a 10 billion euro ($11.6 billion) military satellite network independent of a parallel European programme are raising red flags among some EU lawmakers over potential duplication, fragmentation of efforts and cost. https://lnkd.in/dK3VFr63

Today, on the first day of the Port of the Future Conference, our PureTech team arrived early and promptly engaged authorities from the Port of Corpus Christi, Port Isabel, and Port of Morgan City. Discussions focused on infrastructure upgrades and regional port security requirements. These exchanges underscored aligned objectives for resilient port operations capabilities PureTech delivers to multiple U.S. government and private-sector clients. Notably, recent developments indicate substantial renewed interest in C-UAS technology. PureTech will plan to engage with port security teams and other key stakeholders on this topic in the near term. We reconnected with established industry colleagues and networked with new contacts. Key outcomes included identified opportunities with Terradepth and MerLion, spanning advanced underwater mapping solutions and maritime technology integrations. A key session featured senior commanding staff from the Southwestern Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Their presentation provided detailed insights into budgets, priorities, and emerging needs for regional port infrastructure. The subsequent Q&A session clarified implementation pathways and project alignments. None of this would have been possible without the tremendous efforts of New Wave Media International Director Kevin Clement. His guidance turned a packed agenda into meaningful connections, setting the stage. PureTech Director Ben Renshaw explains visitors how PureTech PureActiv Command and Control system can be utilized for their ports applications.

Steadfast Dart matters for a simple reason: NATO has spent years talking about the post-NRF force model. Steadfast Dart is where that abstraction starts meeting logistics, command architecture, and actual movement. The interesting question is not whether the Alliance can announce a high-readiness force. It is whether it can: — move it on time — integrate it across domains — sustain it under pressure — and do so on Europe’s northern and eastern flanks simultaneously We broke down Steadfast Dart 2026 as a test of force design in practice. Analysis: https://lnkd.in/d-uS4cFf

According to SpaceNews, Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked about work by U.S. Space Command and U.S. Cyber Command at a briefing last week. He characterized both as "the first movers" that provided "non-kinetic effects disrupting and degrading and blinding Iran's ability to see, communicate and respond." Space Command's duties include ensuring resilient U.S. satellite communications and positioning, navigation and timing, while potentially disrupting an adversary's access to space-enabled capabilities such as satellite communications or reconnaissance. https://lnkd.in/geQt2QxW