Karl Loo

Remember when Grab, Uber, Shopee and all gave you 20% off for every transaction? That wasn’t generosity. It was VC money buying mass-adoption AI pricing in 2025 is running the exact same playbook. These model labs are not profitable at current pricing. Anthropic just closed a $30B Series G at a $380B valuation — lifetime funding now over $57B. Mistral has raised $3B+ with a16z leading their latest round. OpenAI’s capital raise is in a league of its own. (The numbers are wildest here) Google is pouring $100B+ into AI infrastructure in this past year alone. They are subsidising your access — deliberately — to accelerate adoption before real compute costs kick in. The implication most people miss: this subsidy has an expiry date. We have seen this movie before. And we know how it ends — the subsidies stop, the prices normalise, and that’s how the platforms make their money. We need to be urgent about AI Adoption not just because of the potential disruption but because the cost is low now. The opportunity is not just for enterprises or government agencies. It is for every Singaporean — to reach prosumer-level AI fluency now, while access is cheap and the learning curve has a subsidy attached to it. This is why I keep returning to the case for AI Credits. Not as a handout. As strategic investment — the same logic that drove broadband subsidies in the 2000s, CPF investment, Changi Airport before demand fully existed: invest ahead of the curve, capture the compounding returns. The countries that get their populations genuinely fluent in AI tools now will have an asymmetric advantage when real pricing arrives. The window is open. It will not stay open. This is why we need to be as fast as possible in driving AI adoption

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Launching a new series: The fastest-growing startups in Southeast Asia — founders, numbers, lessons. First up: ShopBack. From a car brainstorm to $1B valuation. Southeast Asia's cashback king. — 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰: Henry Chan and Joel Leong, two Zalora execs, brainstorm in a car at night. They pool $30K of their own money. Build a prototype in a hotel room in one week. 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱: 55M+ users. 13 markets. $4B+ in annual sales. Profitable. Launching in the US with Amazon, Walmart, Expedia as partners. 11 years. From a rejected government grant to Southeast Asia's largest rewards platform. — What they did differently: 𝟭. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗦𝘁𝗼𝗹𝗲 𝗮 𝗕𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗹 (𝗔𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗱𝗲 𝗜𝘁 𝗕𝗲𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿) Ebates existed in the US. Rakuten in Japan. But Southeast Asia? Nothing. Henry and Joel saw cashback working elsewhere and asked: why not here? The twist: they charged merchants only on completed sales. Zero risk for brands. "With Google, you pay per click even without a sale. With us, it's risk-free." Result: 1,300 merchants signed in year one. 𝟮. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗕𝘂𝗶𝗹𝘁 𝗮 "𝗭𝗮𝗹𝗼𝗿𝗮 𝗠𝗮𝗳𝗶𝗮" All 6 co-founders came from Zalora. They knew e-commerce. They knew each other. "People join a startup because of the idea — but also because of who's already in." This network effect in hiring helped them recruit talent they "otherwise would not have gotten for our size and stage." 𝟯. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗠𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗣𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗹𝘆 In 2021, they bought BNPL startup hoolah. Scaled team from 550 to 900. Chased growth. March 2024: Cut 24% of staff. Shut down BNPL entirely. Henry's message to employees: "I made the mistake of pursuing too many directions and expanding too rapidly. I take full responsibility." Most founders hide. Henry posted it on the company website. 𝟰. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗗𝗶𝗱𝗻'𝘁 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗛𝘆𝗽𝗲 — 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗨𝗻𝗶𝘁 𝗘𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗰𝘀 After the painful reset: → Revenue up 13% (S$133M in FY2024) → Losses cut by 36% → Three consecutive quarters of EBITDA profitability Then they launched in the US — with Amazon, Walmart, and Expedia as partners. 𝟱. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗠𝗮𝗱𝗲 𝗦𝗮𝘃𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗠𝗼𝗻𝗲𝘆 𝗙𝘂𝗻 ShopBack Play. Quests. Gamified rewards. Users who engage with "Quests" spend 80% more than average users. Not just cashback. An engagement machine. — The lesson? The best founders know when to expand and when to contract. They own their mistakes publicly. And they play the long game. 𝗛𝗼𝘁 𝘁𝗮𝗸𝗲: Southeast Asia doesn't need more "grow at all costs" unicorns. It needs more founders who can say "I was wrong" and rebuild. What's the most impressive pivot you've seen in SEA? Josephine Chow Shanru Lai Jacky Ha Kawin Prachanukul Galuh Chandra Kirana Justin Lee IDRF | International Digital Retail Forum 24.online Subscribe — don’t miss E-commerce & Marketing news

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The key to building a venture scale business is to live in the future and work backwards. As an entrepreneur who is going through the zero to one journey with Quanten Media, Even as we are signing up early customers and going through the value delivery playbook and ironing out processes and repeatability, the question in mind is as to how many such transactions do we need to delivery impeccably and in an outstanding way to get to the first 1.5 to 2mn USD in revenue, and in what timeline, what are the resources that will get us there, what is important that needs to be hands on and what needs to be delegated and monitored, and how do we qualify these early customers who will grow with us to become strategic accounts. Each of these decisions are important and it lays the foundation as to what you build from here. If you make it people-centric and not process and organization centric, you risk eroding margins and unreliability as you scale - and there is a limit to how much you can grow. While you are keen to evolve through the zero to one process, it is important to live in the future and work backwards, because that makes you keep an eye on what truly matters.

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Questions at table is, w.r.t. the ban on money games, 1. Is this a good or bad decision? 2. What new sectors will emerge? A question no one is asking: 3. What will happen to founders operating in this category? There’s an ongoing argument about whether banning RMG is a good or bad decision. There’s no correct answer yet — the answer lies in the future. 1. If the government successfully cracks down on illegal betting platforms, then it makes sense. Otherwise, I’m quite sure we’ll revisit this bill within a decade to properly regulate money games again. 2. There were primarily three kinds of players: top, mid, and low tier (based on factors like income, skill, and status). - Top tier were already using less-than-legal platforms to save taxes. - Low tier mostly played for entertainment or to get rich quickly. - Mid tier applied skills and played it like chess. Many low-tier players will now shift to platforms like EloElo or StockGro for entertainment. The mid-tier segment, however, will be left without options — they may even move towards options trading, who knows. 3. For entrepreneurs, it’s a bloodbath. They’ll face layoffs, winding down, legal harassment, and the struggle of pivoting to new directions. In my opinion, since the government has already passed this bill, they should also ensure a smooth environment for businesses to handle these uncertainties properly. Another way to think about the future is through the macro playbook of India’s legal landscape which is closed to China than US. U.S.: It’s hard to recall industries they’ve outright banned. Perhaps their strong law-and-order system enables them to regulate even the toughest sectors. China: Takes a top-down approach. They ban and then regulate. They have also banned money games on Mainland. Yet, they allow exceptions like Macau, where money game thrives. By that logic, maybe Goa could become the Macau of India.

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🌏 I hear the same question from founders across Southeast Asia all the time: should we incorporate in Singapore or the US first? Many founders incorporate in Singapore, then later hit questions like: Do we need a US entity? If so, should it be a US parent or a US subsidiary? What happens if we change our minds? We just published a guide to make that decision clearer and explain how Stripe Atlas can help you set up your US company:https://lnkd.in/gbxJAUQM

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I’ve been looking through the 2025 SEA FinTech Startups review, and the picture feels different from the hype years. Fintech is still the dominant sector in Southeast Asia’s unicorn pool - 22 companies, well ahead of other verticals. E-commerce is next, but finance clearly remains the backbone of the region’s startup ecosystem. #Singapore continues to anchor the market with the largest concentration of unicorn HQs, followed by #Indonesia. That concentration isn’t random - capital, regulation, and regional expansion strategies are still flowing through those hubs. What’s more interesting is the funding pattern. 2025 doesn’t look like a boom year. Early-stage activity is softer. Late-stage hasn’t collapsed, but it’s no longer racing either. The numbers suggest discipline rather than excitement. Wealthtech leads by deal value this year, followed by e-payments and lending. Neobanks and insurtech are present, but they’re not attracting the same frenzy as before. Even the fact that only two new fintech unicorns emerged says something: growth is happening, but selectively. It feels like the region is shifting from “who can grow fastest” to “who can survive and scale responsibly.” If I had to guess what’s next: - More focus on profitability and unit economics - Stronger risk controls in lending - AI quietly embedded in fraud, credit, and operations - Cross-border infrastructure is becoming more important than local wallet wars #SEA fintech doesn’t look weaker. It looks more careful. And sometimes that’s the stage right before a more sustainable cycle begins. #fintech #SoutheastAsia #startups #venturecapital #digitalbanking #payments

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One thing my summer in Southeast Asia made clear: we are in a Tech sector winter. In 2024, tech companies raised just US$2.84B across ~420 rounds—down 59% YoY and 80% below the 2022 peak. H1 2025 added only ~US$2.0B, with Singapore capturing ~92% of capital. Debt financing hit a six-year high as equity dried up. The exit door is barely open. SEA IPO proceeds were ~US$3.0B in 2024, the lowest in nine years. Singapore’s main board had no meaningful tech listings—just four IPOs raising ~US$31m. H1 2025 shows more listings but still small proceeds. For VCs, fundraising by SEA managers hit a seven-year low in H1 2025. Put simply: harder to get money out, less money in. Why? Small markets, thin margins, cut-throat competition, conglomerates protecting their turf, macro headwinds… But a big factor is the string of governance blow-ups and fraud cases. The most publicized is Indonesia’s eFishery. Once hailed as an agri-tech unicorn, investigators now allege 75% of reported sales were fabricated, inflating revenues by ~US$600m. In Aug 2025 the founder was arrested for fraud and embezzlement. Investors, including Northstar, were hit so hard that the once-flagship Indonesian PE firm was absorbed by Ares Management, ending its independent run. Other scandals include Investree (license revoked after CEO’s alleged misuse of funds), Crowde (fictitious farmer loans), MyAirline (collapsed amid money-laundering probe), and Zilingo (accounting irregularities → liquidation). And that’s just what made headlines. On the ground, you hear plenty more. There’s still a path forward: focus on higher profit pools, build profit-first and AI-efficient operations, enforce strong governance, and design for real liquidity—M&A, secondaries, cross-border listings. The digital economy is still growing. The winners will be the ones that grow up fast.

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