Why OT Security Is More Crucial Than Ever: Lessons from the Air India Ahmedabad Crash

On June 12, 2025, the nation woke up to the tragic news of an Air India aircraft crash in Ahmedabad. While investigations are ongoing and it is too early to conclude the exact cause, as an expert in aerospace cybersecurity and Operational Technology (OT) security, I feel compelled to address a critical yet often overlooked domain: the cybersecurity of OT systems in aviation.

Understanding the OT Landscape in Aviation

Unlike traditional IT systems that deal with data, documents, and user access, Operational Technology (OT) refers to the hardware and software systems that directly control aircraft functions, including:

• Flight Management Systems (FMS)
• Engine Control Units (ECU)
• Avionics Data Buses (e.g., ARINC 429)
• Autopilot and Autothrottle systems
• Landing Gear and Flap Actuation Modules
• Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)

When any of these components fail—or worse, are tampered with—the consequences are not just business disruptions. They are catastrophic and life-threatening.

OT vs IT Security: A Critical Distinction

In the context of aviation, IT security protects data; OT security protects lives. The Air India crash is a grim reminder that while IT breaches can cause financial loss and service interruptions, OT breaches can bring down aircraft mid-air or during critical flight phases like takeoff and landing.

Imagine the implications of:

• A compromised flight path via falsified GPS data
• Spoofed Instrument Landing System (ILS) signals during descent
• Malicious override of autopilot or fly-by-wire systems
• Cyber-physical interference in fuel management or hydraulic pressure controls

Any of these vectors could—if unprotected—turn a controlled descent into a tragic disaster.

Where OT Security Often Fails in Aviation

1. Legacy and Proprietary Protocols

Avionics systems use protocols that were never designed with cybersecurity in mind. Standards like ARINC 429 or MIL-STD-1553 lack encryption, authentication, and intrusion detection. Attackers with physical or remote access could inject malicious commands or spoof critical flight data.

2. Air-Ground System Integration Risks

Modern aircraft routinely exchange data with ground systems—via satellite uplinks, ACARS, and maintenance interfaces. If these interfaces are exposed or poorly secured, attackers can exploit pivot points from IT networks into OT systems—a scenario highly relevant in today's digitized aviation environment.

3. Firmware-Level Exploits and Supply Chain Risks

Many flight systems rely on firmware sourced globally. If that firmware contains backdoors, logic bombs, or trojanized updates, it can compromise the aircraft without leaving typical digital forensics traces.

4. Lack of OT Forensic Readiness

Most aircraft have Flight Data Recorders (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR). But OT-level system logs—such as actuator behavior, ECU diagnostics, or sensor anomalies—are often not collected or protected forensically. This limits incident response and attribution capability.

🇮🇳 Why This Matters to India

India is witnessing exponential growth in both commercial aviation and indigenous aerospace programs. We cannot afford to treat OT security as a niche concern anymore. Here’s why:

• Upcoming Tejas Mk-2 and AMCA platforms rely heavily on digital fly-by-wire and mission-critical avionics.
• Civil aircraft modernization, such as AI’s new fleet induction, brings increasing automation and digitalization—each a potential attack surface.
• Airport infrastructure, including ADS-B, radar, and ILS systems, also fall under OT and must be hardened against spoofing and denial-of-service attacks.

What Should Be Done – A Strategic Response Framework

1. Aviation OT Security Policy: India needs a dedicated aviation cyber-physical risk framework that integrates DGCA, MoCA, DRDO, CERT-IN, and private airlines under a unified OT security mandate.
2. Red Teaming for Airborne OT Systems: Simulated cyber-physical exercises on aircraft digital twins and maintenance stations should become routine to identify real-world vulnerabilities.
3. Secure Firmware & Digital Supply Chain Audit: Every avionics module and system update must undergo binary-level threat assessment and code signing validation.
4. Airborne Cyber Forensics Program: Expand the scope of black box systems to include real-time anomaly detection, tamper-evident logging, and secure telemetry backups.

In Closing: The Stakes Have Never Been Higher

While it's premature to link the Ahmedabad crash to a cyber-physical attack or OT compromise, the mere plausibility should alarm us. The line between physical and digital threats in aerospace is vanishing.

If a flight goes down today, we must be able to confidently rule out not only mechanical faults but also malicious digital manipulation. That confidence only comes with robust OT security engineering—not after a tragedy, but well before it.

Let us hope the Air India incident becomes a turning point for how India views aviation cybersecurity—not as an IT add-on, but as a core OT imperative.