Tim He’s Post

European startups struggle to access late-stage capital. Why? The short answer: lower fund sizes and LP composition reflects European institutional investors, including pension funds, historical underallocation to VC vs. their US counterparts. But what if we look from a broader perspective? Fragmentation sorts startups into two tracks with no middle ground. A) They target the European market and underscale, navigating a patchwork of legal entities, tax regimes, and regulations for an effectively small addressable market. B) They go born-global from day zero. And when they succeed, capital flows in from the US. Think about ElevenLabs: $500M Series D, led by Sequoia Capital and Andreessen Horowitz. Europe incubates, America scales. And the irony is that born-global success stories confirm LP bias — the best companies leave the European capital ecosystem before they need the big checks, so institutional investors never build the track record that would justify higher allocation. The underallocation is the rational response to underperformance, which is the rational response to fragmentation. A true Single Market for services and digital breaks this loop at the root. It creates a third track: companies that scale within Europe first, across a large frictionless home market, then go global. As American companies do. European institutional investors would be incentivized to unlock funds, European capital would flow, and keep European champions European. The good news? The pieces are there. Political momentum is (slowly) building, starting from EU–INC. And $210 billion in European pension funds could be unlocked, if US investment levels are matched (Atomico). HORA

Why is Silicon Valley running US science and technology policy? I have a new article in Finance and Society Journal — published today — examining 'Political Necessity in an Age of Hypergrowth: Venture Capital and the Silicon Valley Consensus.' It argues that VC-backed hypergrowth has progressively hollowed out the state's capacity to govern technology and the disruption that ensues — not by force, but by structurally outpacing it. I call this dynamic the Silicon Valley Consensus (SVC): an ideological and institutional formation that renders venture capital-driven disruption politically necessary, and repositions the state as ratifying transformations already imposed on society. The argument draws on Carl Schmitt's concept of sovereignty — 'sovereign is he who decides on the exception' — to show what happens when that competence migrates upstream, into boardrooms, term sheets, and the everyday infrastructures of social life. Today's FT story about Trump appointing Zuckerberg, Andreessen, Ellison, Huang, and Brin to the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology — co-chaired by David Sacks — reads less like news and more like a case study from the paper. Several of those appointees have made seven-figure donations to Trump-linked causes. The 'Golden Age of Innovation' framing in the White House statement, meanwhile, is SVC ideology in its purest form. Three concepts from the paper are worth flagging: 1. The SVC as anti-politics machine: VC-backed hypergrowth depoliticizes itself while trapping regulatory institutions in a field of necessity. The result isn't deregulation — it's that regulation arrives after the fact, ratifying what has already been built. Society becomes the object of private manipulation — reshaped before politics can respond. 2. Political necessity: the imperative for governing bodies to adapt to rapid change introduced by disruptive innovation, rather than leading or shaping its outcomes. The state retains sovereign office; the competence to decide has shifted. 3. Mutant neoliberalism: where the Washington Consensus prescribed market reforms, the SVC prescribes market-mediated technology as the solution to every social problem. Poverty, isolation, disease — all now assigned to the product roadmap, bypassing democratic deliberation entirely. The paper is part of a special issue on the political economy of venture capital in Finance and Society Journal, which I co-edit alongside excellent contributions from Tim White, David Kampmann, Nils Peters, Elke Schwarz, PhD, and Sandy Brian Hager. Read it here (open access): https://lnkd.in/gHfXrex6

A Grant is just a plugin fund sought to help reaching a commercial status for initiating "Commercial buy/sell scenario" with customers... Smart Founders use the grant tenure Strategically as a means to secure 'presales' clients and 'workable sales strategies' for the upcoming product/solution .... because Making Sales sooner is all that matters!

Having Innovate UK funding does not make you investment ready I know that's not what you founders want to hear, especially after the months of effort it takes to secure grant funding. But conflating grant validation with equity readiness is one of the most expensive mistakes I see in high growth start-ups, including deep tech and clean tech and nobody seems to want to say it out loud. Grant committees fund innovation. Equity investors fund returns. These are not the same thing, they never have been, and the sooner founders internalise that distinction, the better their raises will go. The problem is that stacking Innovate UK, SBRI, and Horizon grants feels like proof. And in one sense it is your technology is credible, your team is capable, the validation is real. But an equity investor isn't sitting across the table wondering if your tech works. They're wondering who's going to pay for it, at what margin, and how long they'll have to wait. Most deep tech founders can't answer that. Not because they're not brilliant they usually are. But because nobody told them that the commercial narrative is a completely separate body of work from the technical one. Grant-funded is a stage. Investment-ready is a strategy. 5 signs you're grant-ready but not investor-ready. 1 - Your milestones are all technical; trials, patents, TRL levels, with no commercial equivalent sitting alongside them 2 - You know your funding gap but not your revenue model 3 - Your "customer" in the grant application was a beneficiary, not a paying buyer 4 - You can explain what the technology does, but not what it costs to deliver or what you'll charge for it 5 - Your plan for the next 18 months changes significantly depending on whether the raise happens or not None of these are fatal. All of them need addressing before you sit across the table from an equity investor. If two or more of these landed — let's talk.

It’s true.. VCs are the same as institutional fund managers.. chasing the same sector all the time . 3 years ago it was saas bubble now it’s ai bubble. Family offices think differently.

Most firms launch with noise. futurepresent launched with receipts. A $300M debut fund, built quietly across the US and Europe, then revealed only after the groundwork was already done. No grandstanding, just timing that feels less like a debut and more like a continuation. Thomas Lueke, Johnson Yang, Jan Rettel, and David Meiborg didn’t just assemble capital, they assembled intent. 4 operators with backgrounds spanning Cherry Ventures, General Catalyst, public tech investing, and First Momentum Ventures, deciding a small table beats a crowded room when the stakes are this high. No bloated hierarchy, no theater. Just proximity to builders and conviction that doesn’t wobble. Before the press cycle caught up, they were already in motion. 14 companies deep. Not dabbling, deploying. General Intuition pushing AI into the physical world where software meets gravity. Skalar turning tax workflows into something that actually feels like the future. Afori and inca rebuilding insurance from the inside out. Isidor laying down the pipes for reinforcement learning. Slide keeping the backbone of MSP infrastructure from snapping under pressure. That’s not a portfolio, that’s a map of where things are going. The thesis is tight, and that’s the point. Physical AI, applied AI in complex industries, and the infrastructure that makes both real. No tourist investing. These are sectors where regulation, legacy systems, and operational drag have been quietly taxing progress for years. futurepresent is betting that AI doesn’t just assist here, it absorbs the friction and compounds the upside. And here’s the part people miss when they skim headlines. A $300M fund is one thing. A $300M fund deployed by a 4 partner team that already proved they can source, decide, and execute before anyone’s watching is something else entirely. Speed matters. Taste matters more. But alignment is the real currency, and this structure is built for it. There’s also a transatlantic undercurrent that shouldn’t be ignored. Bridging the US and Europe isn’t new, but doing it with this level of focus on AI infrastructure and real world applications hits different right now. Talent, regulation, and market demand don’t move in sync across regions, which means opportunity lives in the gaps. futurepresent is positioning itself right in that tension. Big respect to Thomas Lueke, Johnson Yang, Jan Rettel, and David Meiborg on the launch. Not just for raising the fund, but for showing what it looks like to move early, stay focused, and let the work speak before the noise shows up. #VentureCapital #AIInfrastructure #DeepTech #AppliedAI #StartupInvesting

The Ultra-Mega Fund Is Back in Style — But Can It Actually Be Deployed Effectively? Fresh PitchBook analysis spotlights a major trend in private markets: after years of caution, ultra-mega funds are roaring back — led by Jeff Bezos reportedly raising up to $100 billion to acquire manufacturing companies and supercharge them with AI automation (per WSJ, March 24, 2026). We’ve seen this playbook before. SoftBank Investment Advisers Vision Fund I closed its first close in 2017 at nearly $100 billion — the largest private fund ever at the time — followed by Vision Fund II at $65.8 billion in December 2019. These vehicles were designed to back transformative technologies. Wins like OpenAI and Arm grabbed headlines, but the results tell a tougher story: nearly nine years in, Vision Fund I has returned just 0.61x to investors (PitchBook data). The Vision Fund series posted a staggering $32 billion loss in fiscal 2023 (including a $14+ billion hit from WeWork), and SoftBank only returned to profitability in March 2025. Steven Buibish, CFA, PitchBook’s director of US private equity research, puts it perfectly: “If a mega-fund fails to cinch huge winners, a few big losses can have a particularly damaging effect on its overall returns.” He adds that managers need “a clear plan to execute and be prepared for an exit quickly if the market is open — otherwise you may be stuck holding a huge asset for much longer than you’d like.” Michael Ewens of Columbia Business School highlights the AI-specific tension: “There are a lot of AI-backed companies, but there’s more capital than there is realized returns… it’s not obvious where the opportunities are.” He warns of the danger of overcapitalization: “There is a tension in raising too much money, because you become a victim of your own valuation.” The core challenges are crystal clear: • Massive dry powder chasing a limited pool of truly category-defining targets   • Heavy dependence on volatile IPO windows amid geopolitical turmoil and tariffs   • Risk of overpaying and structural issues inside large general partnerships   • Amplified impact of any single loss on outsized returns This revival shows renewed LP appetite for concentrated, high-conviction bets — especially around AI and industrial transformation. But it also puts deployment discipline, exit planning, and valuation discipline under intense scrutiny like never before. What’s your take — are we on the cusp of the next wave of industry-shaping value creation at scale, or heading toward another round of overcapitalised mega-bets that dilute returns? Drop your thoughts below 👇 #PrivateEquity #MegaFunds #UltraMegaFunds #VentureCapital #AI #AlternativeInvestments #Fundraising #PrivateMarkets #PitchBook #InvestmentStrategy #DryPowder #HMNCapital

"Europe has a card to play. The frontier has moved toward energy, defence, industrial hardware, and deep tech — sectors where Europe has genuine strengths. Replicating America Capital Partners is neither possible nor necessary. Acting as an urgent buyer and tolerating waste, as the US did between 1941 and 1979, may be enough."

𝗦𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗼𝗻 𝗩𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗲𝘆 𝗵𝗮𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗮𝘆𝗣𝗮𝗹 𝗠𝗮𝗳𝗶𝗮. 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗯𝘂𝗶𝗹𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗼𝘄𝗻. 𝗗𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗹𝘆. What we talk about less than the names is the mechanism. Those founders shared a cap table and a reference point. 𝗦𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗻 𝗮 𝗿𝗼𝗼𝗺 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗽𝗲𝗼𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗯𝘂𝗶𝗹𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗹𝗲 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗹𝘆 𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗳𝘁𝘀 𝘆𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗯𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗵𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗸 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘄𝗵𝗮𝘁'𝘀 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲. YC saw this and built a programme around it. Everyone talks about the YC cheque. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗱𝘂𝗰𝘁 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗵𝗼𝗿𝘁. It was putting founders together at the exact moment their ambitions were still forming. Europe has spent a decade building the capital stack. More funds, bigger funds, the EIC. But even as the capital picture has improved, 𝘀𝗼𝗺𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗮𝗹 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗺𝗶𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴: a cross-border peer network that forms before companies do. This is what Relativity Collective is doing. Launched in January, it brings together 25-30 student founders from 𝘀𝗶𝘅 𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗘𝘂𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗻 𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗵𝘂𝗯𝘀 for a three-day in-person cohort, with a network designed to persist long after. No curriculum, no pitch practice, no capital attached. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝗼𝗻 𝗽𝗲𝗲𝗿 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘅𝗶𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝘁 𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗺𝗼𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁. I think this is what makes it genuinely different from anything Europe has built before. Accelerators and incubators intervene at idea stage. Relativity Collective intervenes earlier, at the stage where ambition itself is calibrated. 𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲: ✴️ Anton Osika (𝗟𝗼𝘃𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 | KTH Royal Institute of Technology | Sweden) ✴️ Paulina Grnarova (𝗗𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗝𝘂𝗱𝗴𝗲 | ETH Zurich | Switzerland) ✴️ Peter Sarlin (𝗔𝗠𝗗 𝗦𝗶𝗹𝗼 𝗔𝗜 | Aalto University | Finland) ✴️ Jan Oberhauser (𝗻𝟴𝗻 | Stuttgart Media University | Germany) 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗻𝗮𝗺𝗲𝘀 𝘀𝗮𝘆 𝗮 𝗹𝗼𝘁 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗲𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗵𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝗶𝗻 𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗱. Melanie Gabriel, who co-initiated the programme, said it best: "𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗳𝗲𝗲𝗹𝘀 𝗮𝗺𝗯𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗼𝘂𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗲𝗻𝘃𝗶𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝘀𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗹𝘆 𝗯𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝘀𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗶𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗼𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿." The founders who never access a peer group calibrated to European scale may be 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗮 𝗰𝗲𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗱𝗼𝗻'𝘁 𝗸𝗻𝗼𝘄 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗵𝗮𝘃𝗲. From what I've seen, diligence rarely covers what shaped a founder's sense of what could be built. That's early stage investing's most underexamined gap. Investors who understand this will source and evaluate talent in ways most of the market won't be looking for. (RC meets RC! Relativity Collective, meet Resilient Collective. Both betting that the right people in the right room changes everything.)

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗹𝘁𝗿𝗮 𝗠𝗲𝗴𝗮-𝗙𝘂𝗻𝗱: 𝗕𝗲𝘇𝗼𝘀’𝘀 $𝟭𝟬𝟬 𝗕𝗶𝗹𝗹����𝗼𝗻 𝗔𝘂𝘁𝗼𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗚𝗮𝗺𝗯𝗹𝗲 The era of the "behemoth fund" has returned to private markets, spearheaded by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos. According to a PitchBook story by Michael Bodley and Rosie Bradbury, Bezos is targeting $100 billion for a new vehicle designed to acquire manufacturing companies and overhaul their operations using AI-driven automation. However, history suggests that raising such a massive sum is often easier than deploying it effectively. Bodley and Bradbury cite the primary cautionary tale of SoftBank’s Vision Fund. Launched in 2017 with nearly $100 billion in capital, the fund was built on the belief that the "Information Revolution" required unprecedented scale. While it backed winners like ARM and OpenAI, it was severely bruised by high-profile failures like WeWork, which led to a $14 billion loss. As of early 2026, Vision Fund I has returned only 0.61x of its initial commitments, proving that massive capital does not guarantee massive returns. The authors argue that deploying $100 billion without undercutting returns presents three critical risks: ● Overcapitalization: Too much cash can inflate valuations unnaturally, making companies "victims of their own price tags" and complicating future exits. ● Deployment Pressure: There is a limited number of "viable" large-scale manufacturing targets. This scarcity often leads mega-funds to overpay just to move capital. ● IPO Dependency: Large assets require "category-defining" exits. In a volatile market shaped by tariffs and geopolitical turmoil, the window for multi-billion-dollar IPOs can close rapidly, leaving funds holding massive, illiquid assets longer than desired. While the "Physical AI" race in manufacturing is a compelling narrative, experts warn that there is currently more capital in the space than realized returns. For Bezos, the challenge will be navigating a "Great Recalibration" where operational excellence and disciplined underwriting must take precedence over sheer financial brute force https://lnkd.in/g8g6gFh5