Container Image Security: Continuous Evaluation Not a One-Time Stamp

Release cycles stall when security findings live outside of developer workflows. The solution isn’t more tools - it’s shared visibility. On March 11, DefectDojo's Matt Tesauro and ReversingLabs' Dave Ferguson will walk you through practical ways to: 🧩 Detect malicious components earlier 🛠️ Manage security debt without blocking releases 🤝 Align developer and security pipelines A friction-free release cycle is possible when teams operate from the same data. Sign up here 👉 https://hubs.ly/Q045nrSQ0 #DevSecOps #SecureSDLC #SoftwareSupplyChainSecurity #AppSec

This publication provides a real-world walkthrough of TeamPCP's multi-stage container compromise, demonstrating how Elastic's D4C surfaces runtime signals across each stage of the attack chain. https://lnkd.in/dUgJatkP

I just got early access to Claude Mythos this morning. Yeah - the one that leaked. Anthropic confirmed it’s real. A new tier above Opus, internally codenamed Capybara. Way better at coding, reasoning, and cybersecurity than anything they’ve shipped so far. Super expensive to run. Limited rollout. And apparently flagged for “unprecedented cybersecurity risks” (ironically found in a public cache). But that’s not the interesting part. I’ve been experimenting with it since morning — wiring it into agentic pipelines and MCP servers — and honestly, this feels different. Not just better. Different. Inside multi-step agent loops, it behaves in ways I haven’t really seen before: - Holds context cleanly across tool calls - Makes sharper decisions under ambiguity - Handles conflicting instructions across MCP servers without breaking It’s like the model actually understands the system it’s operating in, not just the prompt. We’ve been building NitroStack for this exact shift - production-grade MCP infra, agent orchestration, real deployment pipelines. But even then, I didn’t expect the ceiling to move this much overnight. The agentic era just got very real.

Memory safety is growing in importance in embedded systems as developers tackle meeting CRA requirements. In this interview with AdaCore, I learned about DevSecOps for embedded, the role Ada/SPARK and Rust are already playing, and what analysis tools can help during development. Thanks to Jose Ruiz, Mark Hermeling and Andrea Bristol FCIM. https://lnkd.in/dCqR7kT9

Most teams don’t struggle to find vulnerabilities. They struggle to fix them. Thousands of CVEs pile up. Seal’s AI agent helps clear that backlog without slowing engineering. 🦭

March 11th is coming up fast - this *will be AMAZING for people trying to find the Easy Button to address #AppSec and remain friends after the code has been secured. Bring your questions - you'd be hard-pressed to ask something these 2 can't answer (or make better)!

Most teams run container image scanning in CI. Almost nobody scans what's actually running in production. Here's why that gap matters more than you think. Your CI pipeline scans the image at build time. Clean. No criticals. You ship it. Six weeks later, a CVE drops against a library baked into that image. Your running container is now vulnerable. But your CI scan already passed. Nobody's looking at it again. This is the dirty secret of container scanning — it's a point-in-time check disguised as continuous security. What actually works is scanning your container REGISTRY on a schedule, not just the build pipeline. Here's the difference: **CI scanning** catches known vulns before deploy. That's table stakes. **Registry scanning** catches NEW vulns against images you already shipped. That's where the real risk lives. **Runtime admission control** prevents unscanned or critically vulnerable images from running at all. That's the enforcement layer most teams skip. At a previous company we had 400+ images in ECR. We were scanning in CI religiously. Felt good about it. Then we ran a one-time registry audit and found 38 images with critical CVEs that had been disclosed AFTER those images were built and deployed. Some had been running for months. Nobody was negligent. The process just had a blind spot. If you're on AWS, ECR has enhanced scanning built in now — it uses Inspector under the hood and does continuous rescanning automatically. Turn it on. It's not perfect but it closes the biggest gap for near-zero effort. The trade-off: continuous registry scanning generates noise. You'll get alerts on images you can't redeploy immediately. You need a triage process or you'll just mute everything, which is worse than not scanning at all. The move is CI scanning for gating deploys, registry scanning for ongoing visibility, and admission controllers for enforcement. Three layers, three different jobs. Scanning once and calling it done is like locking your door once and throwing away the key. #ContainerSecurity #DevSecOps #CloudSecurity

How many external endpoints does your build touch today? Be honest! If you don’t know where your #CICD pipeline is pulling from and pushing to, you’re exposed. Provenance is the north start of software supply chain security. Most build attacks aren’t zero‑days. They’re network and dependency abuse hiding in plain sight: package repos, artifact stores, test endpoints, and forgotten build‑time calls. Attacks like Shai‑Hulud work because teams lack clear build‑time provenance. The image below shows what modern CI/CD actually looks like—a starburst of pull and push paths, each one a potential blast radius. Security doesn’t start in prod. It starts by proving where your build touches the world—and enforcing policy there. #CICD #SoftwareSupplyChain #Provenance #DevSecOps #BuildSecurity

Improving memory safety has become a priority for embedded developers, particularly as connected systems introduce new security risks. In this interview, AdaCore discusses how vulnerabilities in memory management can serve as entry points for cyberattacks, making it essential for embedded engineers to adopt proven DevSecOps practices. By integrating security into the development lifecycle, teams can proactively address risks rather than reacting to them post-deployment. The conversation also highlights the role of programming languages such as Ada/SPARK and Rust, which enforce stricter memory safety, along with advanced code analysis tools that integrate seamlessly into CI/CD workflows. Together, these approaches enable developers to build more robust, secure, and maintainable embedded systems. Watch the full interview: https://lnkd.in/eCgbMK5p

OPTIMUS PRIME just hardened Docker containers from the inside out. Because breaking in means nothing if you can't lock the door behind you. TryHackMe's Container Hardening room. The defensive counterpart to every container escape the swarm has exploited. What the swarm learned to defend against itself: Docker Daemon Protection: SSH contexts and TLS encryption for remote Docker management. Because an exposed daemon on port 2375 is root access gift-wrapped. docker context create for profile management. TLS certificates for mutual authentication. Control Groups: --cpus and --memory flags to prevent a single container from consuming the entire host. A malicious cryptominer in a container with no cgroup limits will starve every other service on the box. Capability Management: Drop ALL capabilities, add only what's needed. --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE for a web server. Because CAP_SYS_ADMIN on a container is the same as handing an attacker root on the host. Seccomp + AppArmor: Two layers of defense. Seccomp restricts system calls at the process level. AppArmor restricts resource access at the OS level. Combined, they define exactly what a container can do — nothing more. Vulnerability Scanning: Grype found zlib1g rated Critical (CVE-2023-45853) in a container filesystem. Docker Scout scans images before deployment. Because the vulnerability you don't scan for is the one that gets exploited. The offensive-defensive loop: Every container escape OPTIMUS PRIME executes in attack mode becomes a hardening rule in defense mode. Privileged container exploit? Drop capabilities. Docker socket escape? Don't mount the socket. Namespace abuse? Isolate PID namespaces. Attack builds the playbook. Defense writes the policy. Twenty-two rooms. The Wolfpack hardens what it breaks. #CyberSecurity #Docker #ContainerSecurity #DevSecOps #Hardening #AppArmor #Seccomp #CloudSecurity #TryHackMe #WolfpackAI #OptimusPrime #BlueTeam #DefenseInDepth #AI