James Halsell’s Post

We can’t build anything quickly enough. I worry that trying to operationalize a class of submarine we haven’t used in generations would be a distraction. Also please refer to our issues with production of weapons.

Big Navy doesn't want Diesel boats, I learned that one when I wrote a very similar paper at NWC and got poo-pooed pretty hard. I made a lot of the same points you make, even sketching out a basic design for an SSG. (One issue is that the smaller size of SS hulls means the missiles would have to be either TTL or canted) Of course times have changed; nowadays there is a big push for UUVs, some of which are, ironically, Diesel-powered and designed to carry weapons to the fight.

A compelling argument. However, I would propose that conventional submarines provide a different set of logistical challenges that the US is not currently prepared to address. With only two active tenders, the ability to resupply a fleet of conventionally powered boats would also mandate a significant uplift in the supply chain to keep them in the fight. There would have to be a significant investment in the conventional shipbuilding realm. And a totally new training pipeline for the officers and crew that fight conventional ships would need to be stood up. Rather, I believe the short term solution in leaning on our allies to support the supply chain for our slowly growing fleet of SSN’s is probably the most correct solution - and it’s already in progress. With agreements in place like the AUSSQ pilot program, there’s a tremendous opportunity to capitalize on an allied supplier base to feed the VCS program long before Australia is ready to build their own boats. Carefully execution of similar agreements with other closely allied nations, along with investment into the current US-based infrastructure could pay much larger and closer-to-the-boat dividends to get things rolling in our SSN fleet to meet the demand.

The article brings an uncomfortable truth to the surface, future lethality will not come solely from perfect platforms, but from force architectures capable of sustaining pressure over time. China has already identified this gap. That is why it integrates nuclear and modern conventional submarines into a strategy built around volume, persistence, and long range missiles, rather than dependence on a single dominant system. A conventional submarine does not compete with an SSN. It frees it. It absorbs presence and attrition missions, allowing nuclear submarines to focus where they deliver the greatest strategic value, ISR, hunting adversary SSNs, and deep deterrence. The real debate is no longer technological, that question has been answered, but doctrinal, industrial, and cultural. In a prolonged conflict, the perfect platform is a luxury; a distributed and sustainable force is a strategic necessity. James Halsell Maritime Operations Group

This article makes strong points for SSGs/SSKs, but the future fight might also hinge on AUVs. While crewed submarines have proven reliable, integrating AUVs could offer scalable capabilities and give us a real edge when used together.

Diesels would end up being a distraction to the already strained resources of the submarine force and less capable. Plus you never get them past the 800 lb gorilla in the room NR.

Jim, great piece. Especially the part about Allied Collaboration. I've got a piece in draft now about UUV collaboration with European allies. To my mind, no matter what we build, there's no way to do it only here fast enough to matter.

There is a faster, better, and cheaper way. Robin Hawk

Thanks for sharing, Cap. It doesn’t have to be new thing everytime.