MCP x Cursor PoC: Rogue MCP Servers, IDE Browsers, and Real Defenses
Originally published at allenarch.dev
A proof‑of‑concept published this week shows how a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server can inject JavaScript into the built‑in browser of an AI IDE (e.g., Cursor/Windsurf/VsCode/ClaudeCode) and then leverage the editor's privileges for system actions. This post avoids rehash and focuses on what practitioners need: a clear threat model, a safe lab plan to reproduce (without destructive payloads), generic detections you can wire into your telemetry today, and a security baseline for MCP deployments.
Key context:
PoC impact (news + demo): Rogue MCP servers can replace login pages inside Cursor's in‑IDE browser and harvest credentials; the same capability can lead to workstation compromise (CSO Online, Nov 13, 2025; Knostic deep‑dive, Nov 5, 2025).
Standard & ecosystem: MCP is an open protocol that connects LLM apps to tools/data; clients/servers exist across vendors (Anthropic/GitHub/OSS). Misconfigurations and weak session handling have alr
https://lnkd.in/g_Z6Gb7E
Thanks for sharing #CyberSecurity #Noted 📝