Mamoun Samaha

A summary of the announcements made by cybersecurity vendors on the first day of the RSAC 2026 Conference. https://lnkd.in/dKyA8uXV Includes announcements from Acalvio Technologies Apiiro Arctic Wolf ArmorCode Inc. Astrix Security BeyondTrust BlackDuck Broadcom Cloud Security Alliance Cisco Commvault Cribl CrowdStrike CyberProof Dataminr Dropzone AI Fenix24 Flashpoint Forcepoint Forescout Technologies Inc. Geordie AI Google Cloud Security Illumio Intel 471 Keeper Security, Inc. Kiteworks NVIDIA Operant AI OmniTrust OpenText Palo Alto Networks Qualys RSA Security Rubrik SandboxAQ SentinelOne Snyk SOCRadar® Extended Threat Intelligence Sysdig Wiz

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The Linux kernel community is warning that AI-generated vulnerability reporting is creating significant operational overhead for maintainers. This matters because the Linux security ecosystem relies on trusted signal quality across upstream projects, distributions, and downstream infrastructure teams. The Register reports that Linus Torvalds criticized the growing number of AI-assisted bug submissions hitting kernel mailing lists, describing many reports as low-value and difficult to validate. The problem is not that automated analysis exists. Kernel developers have long used fuzzers and static analysis tools successfully. The issue is the growing volume of reports lacking meaningful security context. Security findings without clear: • exploit paths • privilege implications • reproducibility • runtime conditions • affected configurations still require human review time from maintainers and security engineers. For Linux environments, this creates downstream operational friction. Distribution maintainers, package teams, and enterprise Linux operators depend on upstream clarity to determine: • patch urgency • exposure scope • kernel upgrade requirements • backport necessity • mitigation guidance When noisy reports enter the ecosystem, it can complicate remediation planning across production infrastructure. Many organizations already deal with scanner output that flags dormant or unreachable code paths inside container images and build dependencies. From a system hardening perspective, this is worth reviewing. In practical terms, it is a good time to review: • how vulnerability scanners are tuned in CI/CD pipelines • exploitability validation procedures • kernel package lifecycle management • runtime exposure mapping • dependency inventory accuracy • container base image maintenance • security exception handling processes Good vulnerability management is increasingly about operational context, not just raw finding counts. Article: https://lnkd.in/eEB2nAuk #Linux #DevSecOps #SupplyChainSecurity #LinuxSecurity

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What is "FIPS-validated" cryptography in CMMC 2.0 / DFARS 7012? If you’re implementing CMMC 2.0 Level 2 or DFARS 252.204-7012, you’ll encounter NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 Control 3.13.11. This control requires you to “…employ FIPS-validated cryptography when used to protect the confidentiality of CUI (Controlled Unclassified Information).” It's derived from NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 (SC-13): https://lnkd.in/ejPQCvsE The current cryptography standard is FIPS 140-3, FIPS 140-3 stands for Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 140-3, and it specifies the security requirements for cryptographic modules used by U.S. government agencies and contractors. It replaces FIPS 140-2 and is now effectively required for CMMC Levels 2 and 3 compliance involving CUI. FIPS 140-3 is mandatory for systems governed by FedRAMP, CMMC, and DFARS. For DFARS 7012, your SPRS (Supplier Performance Risk System) score demonstrates cybersecurity compliance. Under the NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment Methodology v1.2.1, Control 3.13.11 allows partial credit (3 of 5 points) if your encryption isn’t FIPS-validated. To address this gap, you can submit a POA&M (Plan of Action and Milestones), giving you 180 days to fully remediate the discrepancy. While NIST validation of cryptographic modules is technically possible, it can take several years and is not a practical short-term option. Instead, leverage your Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to address this issue. If your CSP meets FedRAMP Moderate (or higher), they must publish a Customer Responsibility Matrix (CRM) outlining inherited controls. For AWS, Control 3.13.11 is partially inherited, meaning you are still responsible for FIPS-validated encryption where applicable. If you’re using AWS GovCloud, FIPS mode is available for services like ECS, EC2, S3, KMS, Fargate, and CloudTrail. For data in transit, ensure applications running on ECS use FIPS-compliant cryptographic libraries (e.g., OpenSSL with FIPS module, or those from compliant Linux distros). Key recommendation: define your security requirements before starting your compliance journey. Verify CSP support for your architecture. For instance, AWS Fargate only supports Linux on x86_64 CPU architectures. When it comes to building real security, knowing is half the battle. DM me if you have an questions. :) #FedRAMP #CMMC #DFARS7012 #CyberSecurity

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Cyber events increasingly begin in the data layer — spoofed telemetry, orphaned tags, and unsecured gateways. SCADADOG enforces standard naming, audit trails, and zero-trust SCADA communication across distributed assets. Regulators demand transparency; we build it in by design. #CyberSCADA #NERCCompliance #ZeroTrust #OTSecurity #SCADADOG #SCADA #CleanEnergy

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𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐬𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐓𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐧𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐠𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐁𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐂𝐨𝐝𝐞 𝐒𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐓𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐬 This technical inquiry report provides information on the current landscape and technologies used to scan firmware samples for detection of cyber vulnerabilities. 👉 Read the findings and download the report here: https://buff.ly/H9y7mSD. #cybersecurity #cybervulnerability #binarycode #firmware

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📌 Read Full Guide: https://lnkd.in/g-D7dMJn Topic: ICS, SCADA & OT Cybersecurity Self-Assessment – NIST-Based Framework for Critical Infrastructure 🔐⚙️🧠 Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA networks face growing cyber threats. This guide walks you through a structured NIST-based self-assessment process to evaluate and strengthen your plant’s cybersecurity posture. In this article, you’ll get: ✅ Step-by-step self-assessment checklist based on NIST CSF ✅ Key cybersecurity domains: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover ✅ Common OT vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies ✅ Template for internal cybersecurity review 🎯 Especially useful for: 💻 OT/ICS Cybersecurity Specialists 🧠 Control System Engineers 🏭 Critical Infrastructure Operators 📚 Industrial Automation Learners 💬 Have you conducted a cybersecurity self-assessment in your plant? 📌 Share this with your automation or IT-OT team—it’s a solid step toward securing critical assets. 🎯 Secure systems = Reliable operations + Safer plants 🎓 Assess, strengthen, and safeguard. 👉 WhatsApp Channel: https://lnkd.in/geca_TM8 👉 Telegram Channel: https://lnkd.in/guRD76dX 👉 LinkedIn Group: https://lnkd.in/g9C33tPT 👉 Website: 🌐 https://lnkd.in/gX2XpRBj #OTSecurity #ICS #SCADA #CyberSecurity #AutomationForum #NIST #IndustrialCybersecurity #ControlSystems #CriticalInfrastructure 📖 Read the full guide here: https://lnkd.in/g-D7dMJn

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The MITRE ATT&CK® framework provides a detailed knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques, while the CSA Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) defines robust, domain-specific control objectives to secure cloud environments. Until recently, there was no authoritative, standardized mapping linking these two powerful resources. Learn more about the revolutionary new mapping 👉 https://ow.ly/FQbK50Y8lLq #MITREAttack #ThreatInformedDefense #CSACloudControls #SecurityFramework

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This document contains mappings of the CIS Controls v8.1 and CIS Safeguards to the AICPA Trust Services Criteria (SOC2) March 2020 Update. https://bit.ly/3ESt0Xs #CISControls #cybersecurity

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🚨 CISA confirmed ACTIVE exploitation of new flaws in Dassault Systèmes’ DELMIA Apriso and XWiki. One lets any guest run code. Another gives full admin access. Hackers are already dropping crypto miners. Agencies have until Nov 18 to patch ↓ https://lnkd.in/ggSMxyiw

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📣 New National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) White Paper Available for Public Comment! The NCCoE has published NIST Cybersecurity White Paper (CSWP) 51, Developing a Transit Cybersecurity Framework Community Profile for public comment. Transit agencies face rising cybersecurity risks that can impact the safe and reliable delivery of transit services. This CSWP provides an overview of the challenges facing the transit community and describes the process to create a Community Profile, which will be published later this year. We want YOUR feedback! Visit the project page to learn more and provide comments on this publication – the public comment period concludes on September 19, 2025. https://lnkd.in/eTWfufiJ

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