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According to Bertrand Russell in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, a number is defined as the following: "The number of a class (set) is the class (set) of all those classes (sets) similar to it...A number is anything which is the number of some class (set)".

With this being said , one can be defined as the set of all sets that contain exactly one member, two can be defined as the set of all sets that contain exactly two members, etc.

With this being said, let us consider a set that contains 2 as its only element. This set is by definition an element of one since it is a set that contains only one member in it. However, what relation does the elements of the number two have to the set that contains the number two as its only member? Can the elements of the number two be said to be contained in the set that contains two as its only member or not?

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  • You might be interested in Hamkins' book of lectures on the philosophy of mathematics (see here). The first chapter is about, "What are numbers?" and goes over, inter alia, some of the perplexities of Frege/Russell accounts vs. Zermelo and eventually von Neumann accounts of the finite counting numbers. There's even mention of how the number 1 can be set to equal a complicated infinite series, with a discussion as to what this means for the theory of 1 as a simple set. Commented 22 hours ago

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The number 2, according to the above definition (see Russell's Introduction (1919), Ch.2), is the class of all classes "having two elements", where the property is expressed informally. To avoid circularity (we cannot define two using it also in the definiendum) we have to define the basic concept of similarity between classes and then define numbers recursively: zero will be the class of all classes similar to the empty class (), one will be the class of all classes similar to the class having as only elemenet the empty class ({∅}), and so on.

Thus, a class C = {2} has only one element and will be similar to every other class having only one lement.

Therefore, applying the above definition: C ∈ 1.

However, what relation does the elements of the number two have to the set that contains the number two as its only member? Can the elements of the number two be said to be contained in the set that contains two as its only member or not?

Consider for simplicity the following class: {Plato, Socrates}. We have that {Plato, Socrates} ∈ 2.

And {2} ∈ 1. But the relation "be an element of" () is not transitive, and thus, {Plato, Socrates} ∉ 1.

See Why belonging is not transitive for examples.

In the mathematical theory of sets (and classes) there is a clear difference between the relation "is an element of" () and the relation "is a subset of" (, which is transitive).

In common language, sometimes we mix the two, using in both cases: "is contained into".

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  • That’s not a good example though because the set consisting of both Socrates and Plato contain things that are neither members nor subsets of the set such as Plato and Socrates’s body parts and qualities if reified. Commented Oct 30 at 14:53
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    @LorenzoGilBadiola - You are still relying on an informal notion of "... contain things ..." This is not the notion that is used in set theory. The informal notion is usually transitive, the formal one explicitly is not. Set inclusion (being a subset) is transitive, set membership is not. Commented 2 days ago
  • @LorenzoGilBadiola That being said, some logicians characterize individuals, things that could be elements of sets but that themselves are not sets, precisely as things for which a = {a} (i.e. for which there is no distinction between the thing itself and the singleton of that thing). Commented 2 days ago
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    @LorenzoGilBadiola - Indeed. Natural, everyday language is ambiguous. And Russell's informal explanation is also at least ambiguous (and at worst misleading and circular since it's purely intensional). That's why these things can only properly be explained by actually developing/studying the formal theory. Commented 2 days ago
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    Note also that defining individuals ("urelements", non-sets) as those things for which a = {a}, as Quine does, is not generally accepted. Mathematicians like Hao Wang, Bernays, and others have criticized this as gratuitous, unnecessary, without any mathematical advantage and leading to separate problems. Commented 2 days ago
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As a historical note to @MauroALLEGRANZA's answer: It took quite a while for mathematicians to develop a clear (extensional) concept of "set". In particular in regards to the empty set (the unique set that has no elements) and singleton sets (sets that only have one element). It's only with the Principia (~1912), and after the axiomatic development of Zermelo-Fraenkel (~1908-1925) that is became very clear that a ≠ { a } (the set 'a' does not equal the singleton set with 'a' as only element).

In a very good historical overview, The Empty Set, the Singleton, and the Ordered Pair (2003), Akihiro Kanamori writes:

In 19th century logic, the main issue concerning the singleton, or unit class, was the distinction between a and { a }, and this is closely related to the emergence of the basic distinction between inclusion [i.e. being a subset of], ⊆, and membership [being an element of], ∈, a distinction without which abstract set theory could not develop. (...) Surprisingly, neither this distinction, nor the related distinction between a class a and its unit class {a} was generally appreciated in logic at the time of Cantor (1891). This was symptomatic of a general lack of progress in logic on the traditional problem of the copula (how does "is" function?).

Kanamori points to, for instance, Dedekind, who was unclear and confused about this in his work Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? (1888) (~"What are numbers and what's up with them?") since he appears to identify 'a' with '{a}'. (He also points out that Dedekind later became aware of this.)

Kanamori gives a very detailed account of how Russell gradually got clarity, and that, even when class-inclusion and class-membership were seen as distinct, Russel may not have seen that the distinction of a from {a} directly follows from making that other distinction. That is, we can prove in first-order logic that ∀a (a = {a}) is logically equivalent to ∀a∀b (a ⊆ b ⇔ a ∈ b) (which would be tantamount to making the distinction useless).


To come back to the OP's question:

"The number of a class (set) is the class (set) of all those classes (sets) similar to it" (Russell) (...) [L]et us consider a set that contains 2 as its only element. This set is by definition an element of one since it is a set that contains only one member in it.

Note that Russel's words are pretty informal. His statement is not incorrect, perhaps, but it can easily lead to misinterpretation. If you define numbers in that way, as equivalence classes of classes, without further explanation or caveats, you run the risk (or at least the suspicion) of circularity and you are almost forced to adopt a kind of platonistic point of view. Not just this, you run the risk of obliterating the distinction between set-membership and set-inclusion! Since, indeed, in this case the number 2, and any other natural number, would then seem to be "contained" in the number 1 (the similarity class of all singleton classes).A So, even either 1 or {1} would seem to be "contained" in 1. (Whatever interpretation you here give to "contained", this then seems to imply that all the natural numbers would have to be 'given' all at once, in a kind of platonistic vision.)

In the elegant construction of natural numbers that was later developed by Von Neumann (~1923) circularity is avoided (and extensionality is preserved) by grounding each natural number, recursively, in previously constructed sets:

0 =def
1 =def {0} = {∅}
2 =def {0, 1} = {∅, {∅}}
etc.

So, we start from the empty set, and at each step apply the rule: n + 1 =def n ∪ {n}. In this case the number 2 is defined as one particular set, namely, the set {0, 1}. This set, by construction, has exactly two elements (each of which are well-defined sets). Any other set that has exactly two elements can be mapped to that with a bijection (a one-to-one mapping). So, in a way we can salvage Russell's characterization, by defining a kind of emblematic set, the number 2, that indirectly represents all pairs. It's problematic, however, to try to start from a concept of "all pairs" (or more generally, from an unrestricted concept of equivalence classes).


(A) Strictly speaking: If 1 is defined as the equivalence class of all singleton sets, then the set {2}, rather than 2, would be "contained" as element in 1. But the point is that this doesn't avoid circularity in the definition. Russell gives an informal, but completely general definition of "(natural) number". But it's impossible to give a general definition without circularity unless you start from a given first number or set (zero or one) and apply a recursive rule.

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I think the root of your difficulty is that you are mixing up the mereological notion of "part" (which is transitive) and the set-theoretic notion of "element" (which is not necessarily transitive).

In mereology terms, suppose I have a volleyball team Spikemasters comprised of two players, Alice and Bob. Then Alice is "part of" Spikemasters, and Bob is "part of" Spikemasters. Further, Alice's right arm is "part of" Alice, and Bob's left leg is "part of" Bob. Therefore, Alice's right arm and Bob's left leg are each "part of" Spikemasters.

But set theory is different (by definition). A set can have as its elements both "atoms" (non-sets) and also other sets, but the elementhood relation is not transitive. If set B is an element of set A, that does not imply that B's elements are also elements of A.

One metaphor I like to explain this is to imagine a website having two kinds of entities, articles (analogous to atoms) and users (analogous to sets), and a "like" button whereby a user can "like" an article or another user (the things that a user "likes" are thus analogous to the elements of a set). If user Jim "likes" an article, and user Sue "likes" Jim, it does not necessarily mean that Sue also "likes" that same article.

  • Of course, to make this metaphor more rigorous, we would need this to be an infinite website, with infinitely many articles and users. And also we would need a requirement equivalent to the Axiom of Extensonality, i.e. two different users cannot "like" the exact same collection of things (if A and B are two different users, there must be some user or article X such that (XA and XB) or (XB and XA))

So, to circle back to your specific question, if 2 is the set representing the number "two", and S = {2}, then S has only one element (the elements of 2 are not elements of S)

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The set {2} has only 1 element so it represents the number 1.You are confused because we write '2' as a set with 2 elements.

Lets analyse this a bit more:

the set {2} = {{.,.}} which means it is 1 since the inner brackets define .,. as a single object so there is no contradiction.

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  • The OP wrote "This set (the set that contains the number 2 as its only element) is by definition an element of one since it is a set that contains only one member in it." So, he was not confused about this point. The question was about the meaning of "contains". Commented 2 days ago
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    It's a bit like seeing the word "RED" written in blue ink, it is harder to say the word. Commented 2 days ago

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