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Philosophy

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    @JosephO'Rourke, The argument of user4112 is: There is no evidence against that certain brain processes have the property of being consciously represented to the agent as mental states we describe as beliefs, desires, intentions and actions. If these processes did not have their representational properties then they would not have the causal powers they have. Hence my conscious experiences have important causal influences. Sorry, but why this argument can not be accused of "argument from Ignorance" and "begging the question" fallacies? Commented Jul 23, 2013 at 15:30
  • Not addressing either this answer or the comment directly, let me mention that one point Wegner concedes is that our sense that we have willed an action is a strong (but not infallible) indicator that we were in fact the agent of that action. Commented Jul 23, 2013 at 16:18
  • @JosephO'Rourke Why Wegner see will as a causal force if it isn't necessarily conscious, is beyond me. If will isn't conscious it isn't will. Commented Jul 23, 2013 at 18:08
  • @Ricardo: I am not sure that he does see will as a causal force. He views unconscious forces as the causal link, and our sense of will a reaction to those unconscious forces. Or so I remember... Commented Jul 23, 2013 at 18:11