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Licenze e certificazioni
Pubblicazioni
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Randomization can't stop BPF JIT spray
11th International Conference on Network and System Security
The Linux kernel Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) and its Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler are actively used in various pieces of networking equipment where filtering speed is especially important. In 2012, the Linux BPF/JIT compiler was shown to be vulnerable to a JIT spray attack; fixes were quickly merged into the Linux kernel in order to stop the attack. In this paper we show two modifications of the original attack which still succeed on a modern 4.4 Linux kernel, and demonstrate that JIT spray is…
The Linux kernel Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) and its Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler are actively used in various pieces of networking equipment where filtering speed is especially important. In 2012, the Linux BPF/JIT compiler was shown to be vulnerable to a JIT spray attack; fixes were quickly merged into the Linux kernel in order to stop the attack. In this paper we show two modifications of the original attack which still succeed on a modern 4.4 Linux kernel, and demonstrate that JIT spray is still a major problem for the Linux BPF/JIT compiler. This work helped to make the case for further and proper countermeasures to the attack, which have then been merged into the 4.7 Linux kernel.
Altri autoriVedi pubblicazione -
SELint: An SEAndroid Policy Analysis Tool
3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy
SEAndroid enforcement is now mandatory for Android devices. In order to provide the desired level of security for their products, Android OEMs need to be able to minimize their mistakes in writing SEAndroid policies. However, existing SEAndroid and SELinux tools are not very useful for this purpose. It has been shown that SEAndroid policies found in commercially available devices for multiple manufacturers contain mistakes and redundancies. In this paper we present a new tool, SELint, which…
SEAndroid enforcement is now mandatory for Android devices. In order to provide the desired level of security for their products, Android OEMs need to be able to minimize their mistakes in writing SEAndroid policies. However, existing SEAndroid and SELinux tools are not very useful for this purpose. It has been shown that SEAndroid policies found in commercially available devices for multiple manufacturers contain mistakes and redundancies. In this paper we present a new tool, SELint, which aims to help OEMs to produce better SEAndroid policies. SELint is extensible and configurable to suit the needs of different OEMs. It is provided with a default configuration based on the AOSP SEAndroid policy, but can be customized by OEMs.
Altri autoriVedi pubblicazione -
Randomization can't stop BPF JIT spray
Black Hat Europe
Abstract, whitepaper and slides are available on the Black Hat Europe 2016 website.
Altri autoriVedi pubblicazione -
Characterizing SEAndroid Policies in the Wild
2nd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy
Starting from the 5.0 Lollipop release all Android processes must be run inside confined SEAndroid access control domains. As a result, Android device manufacturers were compelled to develop SEAndroid expertise in order to create policies for their device-specific components. In this paper we analyse SEAndroid policies from a number of 5.0 Lollipop devices on the market, and identify patterns of common problems we found. We also suggest some practical tools that can improve policy design and…
Starting from the 5.0 Lollipop release all Android processes must be run inside confined SEAndroid access control domains. As a result, Android device manufacturers were compelled to develop SEAndroid expertise in order to create policies for their device-specific components. In this paper we analyse SEAndroid policies from a number of 5.0 Lollipop devices on the market, and identify patterns of common problems we found. We also suggest some practical tools that can improve policy design and analysis. We implemented the first of such tools, SEAL.
Altri autoriVedi pubblicazione
Corsi
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Algoritmi e programmazione
02MNOOA
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Analisi matematica I
16ACFOA
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Analisi matematica II
23ACIOA
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Basi di dati
04AFQOA
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Calcolatori elettronici
12AGAOA
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Chimica
15AHMOA
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Computer Networks II - Advanced Features P
T-110.5111
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Controlli automatici
18AKSOA
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Cryptography and Data Security
T-79.4502
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Cryptology P
T-79.5501
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Elettronica applicata e misure
03MOAOA
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Elettrotecnica
01AULOA
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Fisica I
17AXOOA
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Fisica II
03AXPOA
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Geometria
17BCGOA
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Informatica
12BHDOA
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Information Security
CSE-C3400
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Laboratory Works in Networking and Security
T-110.5102
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Methods and Tools for Network Systems
CSE-E4430
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Metodi matematici per l'ingegneria
05BQXOA
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Mobile Cloud Computing
T-110.5121
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Mobile Systems Security
CSE-E5480
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Network Security
T-110.5241
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Programmazione ad oggetti
05CBIOA
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Reti di calcolatori
12CDUOA
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Seminar on Internetworking P
T-110.5191
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Sistemi e tecnologie elettroniche
02NVAOA
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Sistemi operativi
05CJCOA
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Special Assignment in Networking and Security P
T-110.6101
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Special Course in Information Security P
T-110.6220
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Teoria ed elaborazione dei segnali
01MOOOA
Riconoscimenti e premi
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Session Chair
ICISSP 2017
Lingue
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Italiano
Conoscenza madrelingua o bilingue
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Inglese
Conoscenza professionale completa
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