ISD (Institute for Strategic Dialogue)

Non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII) abuse is a significant and growing form of gender-based violence. NCII refers to intimate images or videos of a person that are created, distributed or threatened to be disseminated without their consent. ISD’s latest Explainer explores this form of violence, including its rising prominence, gendered nature and synthetic forms. NCII abuse is not an isolated form of harm but embedded within broader structures of gendered violence: At 38.5 percent, LGBTQ+ individuals report a rate of victimisation that is almost double that of non-LGBTQ+ individuals (20.5 percent). Women report higher levels of impact by NCII than men and are disproportionately represented in non-consensual deepfake material, with estimates that around 99 percent of online deepfake content features women. Like other forms of gender-based violence, NCII abuse is often perpetrated by trusted individuals, such as friends or family, rather than strangers. ISD’s Explainer also describes how legislative, technological and societal responses to NCII abuse have been plagued by implementation challenges and online platforms’ insufficient, reactive policies. Read the full Explainer on NCII abuse below. https://lnkd.in/ewtyEkDG

New ISD analysis finds that multiple Russian state-sponsored and aligned information campaigns are targeting Armenia's upcoming parliamentary elections, in an attempt to undercut Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. The analysis shows that Russian operations, including Storm-1516, the Russian Foundation to Battle Injustice and Operation Overload, used coordinated tactics to influence political discourse in Armenia and weaken trust in democratic institutions. ISD identified more than 30 Storm-1516 campaigns targeting Armenia between April 2025 and April 2026, making Armenia the operation’s most frequently targeted country during that period. The campaigns relied on sophisticated tactics including fake media outlets, impersonated news websites, AI-generated videos, manipulated celebrity content and coordinated amplification through influencers, primarily on X. Many of the narratives sought to portray Armenia’s leadership as corrupt, anti-Christian and aligned with foreign interests. The findings highlight how increasingly sophisticated influence operations are being used to manipulate public opinion, destabilise democratic institutions and shape geopolitical alignment across the wider region surrounding Russia. Read the full ISD analysis here. https://lnkd.in/e9strui7

How do misogyny, targeted hate, and violent extremism intersect online—and what can be done to address them? A new ISD toolkit, developed as part of Project Catalyst—a consortium led by the Christchurch Call Foundation—explores the growing overlap between technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV), targeted hate and violent extremism and what these converging harms mean for policymakers, regulators, law enforcement, prevention practitioners and tech platforms. Alongside practical guidance, the toolkit introduces a new harms taxonomy to support clearer identification and classification of these overlaps, and examines legal frameworks in Jordan, Kenya and Canada alongside wider international policy approaches and best practices. The toolkit synthesises more than 200 harm types from 20 existing taxonomies, drawing on a review of academic and policy literature. The resulting taxonomy, grounded in TFGBV sector best practice and drawing from HumaneIntelligence's TFGBV taxonomy and evaluation methodology, maps violent extremism against five core TFGBV harm types. Read the full toolkit below. https://lnkd.in/etSybgnq

How do misogyny, technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV), targeted hate, and violent extremism intersect online—and how can policymakers, practitioners and tech companies better respond?  Today, ISD is launching a new toolkit developed as part of Project Catalyst, a consortium led by the Christchurch Call Foundation focused on addressing the role of misogyny in violent extremism.  The toolkit provides:  🔵 A practical harms taxonomy to help identify overlaps between TFGBV, targeted hate, and violent extremism  🔵 Guidance for policymakers, regulators, law enforcement, prevention practitioners, civil society, researchers, and tech companies  🔵 Analysis of legal and policy approaches across Jordan, Kenya, and Canada, alongside wider international good practice  🔵 Practical resources to support stakeholders responding to these evolving online harms  We are grateful to all partners, practitioners and experts who contributed to this work.  Read the toolkit here. https://lnkd.in/etSybgnq

Anonymity, limited moderation and “wizards”, alongside the users requesting such content, have created permissive conditions on 4chan for misogynistic communities centred around synthetic non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII). In new research from ISD, we analyse conversations within these spaces at scale, finding that online communities themselves facilitate, organise and reinforce this abuse on 4chan. One striking finding was the prominence of the terms “wizard” and “wiz” (777 mentions across the dataset), which were used to frame creators of abusive imagery as possessing expertise worthy of recognition and reward, thereby contributing to the glorification of perpetrators of NCII. These discussions frequently existed alongside dehumanising language directed at victim-survivors, reflecting the misogynistic dynamics and social hierarchies embedded within these spaces. Many users also appeared to use 4chan—a platform that does not require account creation—as a launching point to more private platforms such as Discord, Telegram, Kik and Teleguard, illustrating how harms migrate across the online ecosystem and become increasingly difficult to monitor and address. The case of 4chan also highlights broader challenges within existing online safety frameworks. Platforms that may present significant risks are not always subject to the same obligations as larger services, meaning enforcement can rely heavily on user reporting mechanisms. Therefore, smaller but high-risk platforms—such as 4chan — may face limitations in identifying and addressing harmful or illegal content at scale. Read our findings here. https://lnkd.in/eH4UVY5j

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ISD-US is looking for a Foundation Partnerships Manager. This role will help grow our philanthropic partnerships & lead in proposal development aligned with programmatic priorities, incl. countering hate & targeted harassment, & addressing the impact of emerging tech, such as AI. Deadline: 31 May https://lnkd.in/esit2ttH

How do misogyny, targeted hate and violent extremism intersect online—and what can be done to address them? Join us for the launch of a new ISD toolkit developed as part of Project Catalyst, a consortium led by the Christchurch Call Foundation. The toolkit explores the growing overlap between technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV), targeted hate and violent extremism, and what these converging harms mean for policymakers, regulators, law enforcement, prevention practitioners and tech platforms. Alongside practical guidance, the toolkit introduces a new harms taxonomy to support clearer identification and classification of these overlaps, and examines legal frameworks in Jordan, Kenya and Canada alongside wider international policy approaches and best practices. 📅 Thursday 21 May 🕓 4:00 PM BST / 5:00 PM CET / 11:00 AM ET 💻 Online The session will include opening remarks from CCF, a presentation from ISD researchers, and audience discussion. More information below. https://lnkd.in/eA2HTjDh

ISD is looking for a Latvian-speaking research consultant to support a new project focused on the 2026 Latvian parliamentary elections. Think you'd be a good fit? More details below! Deadline: 28 May https://lnkd.in/e_M6Svdi

Recent attacks targeting British Jewish communities have highlighted how contemporary antisemitism spans online and offline spaces, extremist and mainstream ecosystems and activity linked to both state- and non-state-linked activity. From violent attacks and intimidation to coordinated online hate campaigns, the threats facing Jewish communities are evolving in scale, speed and sophistication. These developments also underline how antisemitism can no longer be addressed through isolated policy frameworks alone. Digital platforms now play a major role in spreading antisemitic content, connecting extremist networks and exposing users to harmful material at speed. At the same time, extremist groups, lone actors and state-linked networks across the ideological spectrum increasingly overlap online, making it harder to separate online radicalisation, hate speech, intimidation and violence. This creates a challenge that is not only about security, but also about social cohesion, public trust and the ability of Jewish communities to participate fully and safely in public life. ISD’s new policy brief offers a strategic framework for confronting the diverse range of antisemitic threats facing British Jewish communities. While recent government measures on policing, communal security and hostile state activity are important, the brief highlights the need for a more integrated and future-proof response capable of addressing the full lifecycle of antisemitic harm. Central to the framework is the recognition that online environments are fundamental to how antisemitic narratives spread, evolve and mobilise real-world harms. The brief also highlights the importance of fully implementing the UK’s Online Safety Act, alongside stronger prevention efforts including digital literacy, education and local resilience-building programmes designed for today’s evolving threat landscape. Read ISD’s recommendations for building a more strategic and coordinated response to antisemitism in the UK below. https://lnkd.in/epDqhizM