Pay to Cite: Applicant Disclosures Drop After the January 2025 IDS Surcharge

by Dennis Crouch

I've been waiting to write about the impact of the major fee changes that the USPTO implemented just before President Trump took office in January 2025. This first cut looks at applicant citations to prior art in their information disclosure statements. What the chart below shows is that the number of references applicants are submitting has dropped tremendously over the past 16 months, and I expect the decline to continue because of the timing lag. Applicant citations per US utility patent, 8-week moving average, falling sharply after the January 2025 IDS surcharge


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Old Soil, New Clock: The DTSA Discovery Rule After Insulet v. EOFlow

The Federal Circuit has wiped out a $452 million trade secret verdict on statute of limitations grounds, holding that Insulet Corporation knew or should have known enough to sue its competitor more than three years before it filed suit. Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow, Co., No. 2025-1807 (Fed. Cir. May 28, 2026). Judge Dyk wrote for the panel, joined by Judge Reyna, with Judge Prost dissenting.

The decision is the sequel to a case I covered two years ago, when the same court reversed a preliminary injunction in Insulet's favor and faulted the district court for ignoring the limitations defense entirely. Dennis Crouch, Trade Secret Misappropriation Preliminary Injunction Reversed, Patently-O (June 17, 2024). On remand, a five-week jury trial produced a huge nine-figure award, paired with a global injunction. All of it is now gone because of delays in filing the lawsuit.

The decision turns on when a trade secret claim accrues under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. The DTSA requires suit within "3 years after the date on which the misappropriation with respect to which the action would relate is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered." The DTSA's statute is similar to copyright law's three year statute of limitations, with a couple of major caveats.

  • DTSA makes clear that "a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim of misappropriation." 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d).  Copyright takes the contrary path. Under Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014), each infringing act is a discrete wrong that starts its own three year clock.
  • The discovery rule is not stated in the copyright statute and continues to be in some dispute about how and whether it applies.  But, the DTSA also makes clear that the clock starts running only once the misappropriation is discovered or reasonably should have been.

It is this second point - the reasonable discovery rule - that is the central debate between the majority and dissent, with Judge Prost accusing the majority of converting a discovery rule into a more onerous inquiry-notice standard.


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The Myth of Patent Growth

by Dennis Crouch

The standard story about American patenting is growth. Published U.S. utility patent applications roughly doubled over the past two decades, climbing from around 200k in 2002 to a peak near 425k in 2024 before easing back in 2025. That top line (grey in the chart below) looks like a steady expansion of American inventive activity. But, the chart actually tells a different story once you separate out what is actually growing.

U.S.-origin original utility applications versus total U.S. utility application publications, 2002 to 2026 estimate

The blue band at the base counts only U.S.-origin originals: applications whose first-named inventor sits in the United States and that are not continuations, divisionals, or continuations-in-part. That band has not grown. It sits in a flat or even declining range across the full twenty-plus years -- and even higher in the mid-2000s than in the most recent completed years.  As a share of the total, U.S.-origin originals fell from roughly a third early in the series to about 13% in 2022 through 2024.

The growth found in grey comes from two sources:

  1. The first source is domestic continuation practice, which has increased over the years. These are follow-on patents relying on the same underlying disclosure of that U.S. original.  Additional exclusive rights without the corresponding additional innovation.
  2. The second source is foreign-origin filing, the rest of the world seeking U.S. patent rights.  These have also grown significantly over the years as more nations come on-line as tech generators.

Neither of these measure growth in domestic original inventive output.

The interesting wrinkle is at the far right of the chart. The 2026 projection, scaled from the first 22 weeks of publication data, projects the U.S.-origin share rising back toward 18%. That reversal has two separate factors.  One is a drop in continuation filings traceable to the January 2025 fee changes. The other is a small increase in U.S.-origin original applications that I don't yet have an explanation for.

Note that timing wise, original applications published thus far in 2026 were almost all filed in 2024 (either as a provisional or non-provisional application). This was before the new administration took charge and began to shift the patenting outlook.


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Why SCA Hygiene Doesn’t Reach Hyatt

by Dennis Crouch

The Solicitor General has now filed the government's brief in opposition in Hyatt v. Squires, No. 25-1049, urging the Supreme Court to leave the Federal Circuit's prosecution laches doctrine undisturbed. The court previously denied parallel cases in:

  • Lemelson Medical, Educational & Research Foundation v. Symbol Technologies, Inc., 537 U.S. 825 (2002),
  • Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Cancer Research Technology Ltd., 565 U.S. 977 (2011), and
  • Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Apple Inc., 144 S. Ct. 290 (2023).

All three of these cases involved variations on the same theme: a direct challenge to the Federal Circuit's authority to use prosecution laches to defeat patent rights when the applicant has complied with every statutory deadline Congress prescribed.

Petitioner Gilbert Hyatt is, in the government's understated description, a "prolific patent filer and litigant." 31 years ago, during the months before the 1995 GATT amendment changed the U.S. patent term from seventeen years from issuance to twenty years from filing, Hyatt filed 381 patent applications, more than any other applicant during what the Federal Circuit has called the "GATT Bubble." Each application was a photocopy of one of eleven earlier filings, each hundreds of pages long and eventually amended to include roughly 300 claims apiece for a total of approximately 115,000 claims across the portfolio. Hyatt's filings sat in the top 0.02% of all applications by claim count per patent. The USPTO ultimately assembled a 12-examiner unit dedicated to processing his portfolio under special procedures (including many USPTO initiated delays), and prosecution of the four applications at issue here extended for decades.  But Hyatt never missed a statutory deadline and eventually sued in district court to get his patents issued.  The district court ruled for the agency on prosecution laches after a three-week bench trial and the Federal Circuit affirmed in August 2025.

Hyatt's cert petition focuses in on two key Supreme Court cases: SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. 328 (2017), and Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014). Those decisions limited laches to a "gap-filling" role and held particularly that the equitable doctrine cannot apply where Congress has enacted statutory timing provisions. Hyatt argues that the Patent Act contains comprehensive timing rules governing every step of prosecution, leaving no gap for the Federal Circuit's judicially created doctrine to fill.

The Solicitor General responds by changing frameworks entirely. The government's brief barely engages with the gap-filling question, instead grounding prosecution laches in a different line of cases: 19th-century equitable doctrines that survived the 1952 Patent Act as "background principles" of patent adjudication, under the framework articulated more recently in Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 594 U.S. 559 (2021).

The debate is about which body of precedent governs the doctrinal question in the first place.


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Revisiting Sixteen Years of §101 After a Data Correction

by Dennis Crouch

Three weeks ago I wrote a big post on §101 rejection rates from the past 16 years pulled from several million office actions -- and also arguing that examiner behavior on eligibility tracks USPTO administrative policy more closely than it tracks Supreme Court doctrine. See Dennis Crouch, Sixteen Years of §101: What Actually Moves Examiners, Patently-O (May 8, 2026). After publishing, I went back through the collection pipeline and found that I had been missing a small, but meaningful slice of the data. Two errors: the optical-character-recognition (OCR) step had been silently failing on the longest office actions, and the bulk USPTO dataset itself had dropped a substantial number of rejections that I then reconstructed using the USPTO API (pulling and parsing each retrieved action individually). I have now reprocessed the full series through May 15, 2026 (adding an additional week of data). The corrected chart does not disturb the central thesis, but it does provide additional insight.

Corrected versus pre-correction Section 101 rejection rate series, 2010-2026

The chat here shows the corrected series (solid) against the original, pre-correction version (dashed). The two are nearly identical through early 2019 but then diverge afterward, with the gap widening through 2024 and 2025.

What you see here is that the post-2019 recovery is substantially larger than my original chart showed, carrying the rejection rate back up to roughly 15.5% by mid-2025, within striking distance of the pre-PEG peak. The most recent decline, running through the Stewart and Squires tenures, is also larger than the original series indicated, though it remains small set against the size of the post-2019 trajectory.


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Inter Partes Review in 2026

The chart above tracks IPR petitions filed by month from 2015 through May 2026. For most of that decade, filings hovered in a band between 100 and 185 per month, with a long-run trend line sloping gently downward. Then something dramatic happened: beginning in 2025 , filings fell off a cliff. The numbers for 2026 are the lowest since the AIA’s post-grant review system was fully operational.

The story of 2025 was collapsing institution rates. Director Squires assumed personal control of all institution decisions in October 2025 and proceeded to deny grant petitions at a rate approaching zero. The story of 2026 is the market’s response. Practitioners have done the math: if IPR petitions are denied at the front end regardless of merit, the cost-benefit calculus no longer works.

The IPR system, at least in its original form as a cost-effective alternative to district court litigation for challenging patent validity, is functionally suspended.

The Unjust Enrichment Option: A Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Choice of Remedy

by Dennis Crouch

A trade secret plaintiff's willingness to license its secret does not limit future recovery to a reasonable-royalty measure.  In Versata Software, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 2024-1140 (Fed. Cir. May 22, 2026), the court found that the plaintiff may still recover under alternative damages theories, such as the defendant's unjust enrichment.

Our various trade secrecy statutes provide for both actual-loss damages and also for unjust state and federal trade secret statutes provide several alternative damages calculation approaches.  The DTSA, for example allows for both:

(I) damages for actual loss caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret; and

(II) damages for any unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret that is not addressed in computing damages for actual loss.

The statute goes on to state that one alternative form of damages may be "imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for the misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or use of the trade secret." 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B).

Versata was litigated under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which provides parallel remedy language.  Notably, both statutes authorize unjust enrichment recovery as a matter of statutory right.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit found the lower court erred by preventing the unjust enrichment recovery.  The court also reversed the district court's reduction of an $82.26 million breach-of-contract award down to $3 and reinstated the jury's number.

Ford hired Versata (then Trilogy) to develop vehicle-configuration software, licensed two products under a 2004 Master Subscription and Services Agreement (MSSA), and then, when renewal talks broke down in 2014, released its own configuration software that Ford had developed while still licensing Versata's product. As things came to a head, Ford sued first, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had neither infringed Versata's patents nor misappropriated its trade secrets. Versata answered with counterclaims for misappropriation under the DTSA and MUTSA, asserting three interdependent "combination" trade secrets along with a breach-of-contract claim under the MSSA.

The doctrinally interesting work, though, is on remedies, and it turns almost entirely on the structure of the statutory damages provisions.


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Borrowing from the Board: District Court Obviousness in the Post-IPR Era

In Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. v. Lupin Ltd., No. 24-2297 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2026) (nonprecedential), a Federal Circuit panel affirmed Judge Andrews’s bench-trial judgment that Lupin’s tolvaptan ANDA process does not infringe Otsuka’s U.S. Patent Nos. 8,273,735 and 8,501,730, and that the asserted method claims are invalid as obvious over Kondo’s 1999 small-scale synthesis paper.

I want to use this fact-bound affirmance as a vehicle for a broader doctrinal point. With Director Squires having effectively shut down inter partes review for most filers, district courts are now being asked to step up and do the §103 obviousness invalidation work. The PTAB has spent more than a decade building out the operational process of obviousness adjudication, with thousands of final written decisions parsing motivation to combine, motivation to modify, reasonable expectation of success, lead compound and lead reference selection, and the weighing of secondary considerations. That body of decisional law is the most extensive working corpus of patent obviousness doctrine in the United States. For bench trials, where the judge wears the factfinder hat, that corpus should be treated as persuasive authority and cited directly. For jury trials, the same corpus is much harder to deploy because the PTAB did the bulk of its work as a factfinder, and that role belongs to the jury, not the court.

Pre-AIA, defense counsel often steered away from §103 invalidity in district court and were especially wary of putting obviousness to a jury. The presumption of validity and clear-and-convincing burden, and the natural complexity of almost every patent made an obviousness finding seem like a long shot.  But, I believe we are at a different place now. The PTAB has cancelled thousands of claims on obviousness grounds over the past dozen years, demonstrating that many issued patents have §103 vulnerabilities that may also be exploited in district court litigation.

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Categorical Rules Cut Both Ways: Originalist Equity, NPE Status, and the Symmetry of eBay’s Four-Factor Test

by Dennis Crouch

Collision Communications, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 2:23-cv-00587-JRG (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2026)

I previously wrote about this case when the permanent injunction was pending. Judge Gilstrap has now denied the motion, but the opinion also indicates some instances when non-practicing entities (NPEs) could block ongoing infringement.

Judge Gilstrap's opinion takes a middle ground.

  • It rejects the categorical rule Collision sought, that ongoing patent infringement presumptively constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law under 18th-century Chancery practice (as reinterpreted through Trump v. CASA, 606 U.S. 831 (2025)).
  • And it also rejects Samsung's opposite position, that a non-practicing patent owner cannot establish the harms required under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).

The first two eBay factors are typically the most important: irreparable harm and inadequacy of monetary relief.  Here, the court found that Collision proved both of those, but failed on the trailing two: balance of hardships and public interest.  With the result of the injunction being denied.

Although not a party, the USPTO/DOJ filed briefing (a statement of interest) in the case arguing that non-practicing patent owners should not be categorically barred from injunctive relief, and that the inherent difficulty of valuing patents and calculating damages can itself support a finding of irreparable harm under certain circumstances. The government at the same time declined to endorse Collision's more aggressive theory that ongoing infringement constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law under 1789 equity principles. Ultimately, Judge Gilstrap appears to have adopted the government suggestions.

Despite denying injunctive relief, the key passage from the decision is the court's flat rejection of any NPE carve-out: "this Court rejects the position that a non-practicing entity can never establish irreparable harm. . . . The USPTO does not issue patents with a gold seal if the holder practices the patents, but issues patents with only a silver seal when they do not." A non-practicing patentee can satisfy the eBay factors, the court held, even if it usually will not.


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Williamson Found Its Mark: New Data on Functional Claim Language, 1976-2026

by Dennis Crouch

Twelve years ago I posted a chart on Patently-O tracking three patterns of functional claim language across U.S. utility patents from 1976 through 2013.  The chart showed the steep post-1994 collapse of traditional means-plus-function claims and the simultaneous rise of "configured to/for" as the patent attorney functional replacement of choice. See Dennis Crouch, Functional Claim Language in Issued Patents, Patently-O (Jan. 23, 2014). [Read this post via PDF]

That data was collected and published the year before the en banc decision in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  This post extends the dataset up to May 2026 and adds a fourth time series capturing the construction Williamson brought within the reach of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f): a generic "nonce" noun coupled with a functional linker phrase (e.g., "module for"). The full dataset now covers approximately 8.3 million utility patents issued from January 1976 through mid-May 2026.

Functional Claim Language in U.S. Patents, 1976-2026

The headline updates from 2014 are dramatic but unsurprising. "Configured to/for" now appears in almost 50% of utility patents issued. It overtook "means for" around 2008-2009 and surpassed the "for [Verb]ing" construction in 2014. Traditional means-plus-function language has fallen to less than 3% of utility patents, a huge decline from its 1980s modern peak.

The new finding, and the one I focus on more in this post is a new fourth line. The Williamson-targeted "nonce" words rose from roughly 11% of utility patents in 1976 to a peak of 20% in 2010-2014, then turned downward through the post-Williamson decade and now sits at about 16%. A companion per-word chart below shows the decline concentrated in exactly the nonce terms the Federal Circuit has flagged: "unit" and "module" both peak at 2014 and decline thereafter, while potentially structurally loaded terms like "device" continue rising. Williamson appears to have done meaningful work, at least to shift language.


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The Survivors: Post-IPR Claims, the Presumption of Validity, and the Limits of § 285

by Dennis Crouch

The Federal Circuit's May 15, 2026 decision in mCom IP, LLC v. City National Bank of Florida, No. 24-2089 (Fed. Cir. 2026), splits cleanly down the middle. Judge Taranto, writing for the panel, affirmed the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of mCom's infringement complaint with prejudice. But the same panel reversed both the $33,986 attorney-fee award entered against mCom under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and the $50,619 sanction entered against mCom's local counsel Victoria Brieant under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Federal Circuit declined to remand for further proceedings on either fee determination.

Several claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,862,508 had been cancelled during IPR proceedings.  But in this litigation, mCom asserted the four non-challenged claims.  City National argued those claims were "not patentably distinct" from the already cancelled claims, and the district court agreed.  On appeal, mCom argued only patent eligibility under § 101, a doctrine that was not responsive to the obviousness ruling.   So, the dismissal was an easy affirm.

The reversal of the fee award is the more doctrinally interesting.  I see the panel's reasoning as a defense of the statutory presumption of validity even when invoked by a patent owner whose counsel has accumulated a substantial record of judicial sanctions in other proceedings.


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Justice Up Close: The Federal Circuit Opens Its Doors for America 250

by Dennis Crouch

I was out in the woods this past weekend staffing an MKP retreat and so missed the Federal Circuit’s annual Judiciary Conference.  But, the highlight was almost certainly the debut of the Federal Circuit’s first (and so far only) theme song, a Schoolhouse Rock-style cartoon explainer of the court.

See Dani Kass, Fed. Circ. Drops A Theme Song, Talks Guest Judges, Law360 (May 15, 2026).

The Federal Circuit has also expanded its Center for Innovation & Law and is opening the doors to a new exhibit: “Justice Up Close, History All Around,” a free America 250 program offering timed-entry tours, mock trials in a working courtroom, Dolley Madison’s restored parlor, NASA artifacts, and direct conversations with federal judges.


May 19: If you want free tickets, the first wave is available May 19 at 11:30 a.m. Eastern, at innovationcenter.cafc.uscourts.gov.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the only federal court of appeals defined by subject matter rather than geography. Congress created it through the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, by merging the old Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Its docket runs across patent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), Court of Federal Claims and Tucker Act cases, Court of International Trade cases, Merit Systems Protection Board appeals, veterans benefits appeals from the Veterans Court, and trademark cases from the TTAB.

The buildings themselves are super interesting, including the Cutts-Madison House, where Dolley Madison lived after James Madison’s death in 1836.  The neighboring property housed the National Woman’s Party during the suffrage movement, and NASA used the complex as its first Washington headquarters during the Mercury and Apollo programs.

Drafting Fixable vs. Amendment Created: A Tale of Two §112 Rejections

I’ve been reading through a lot of office actions lately.  I think these two charts are interesting that show opposite workflow patterns for the two main §112 rejection grounds. For indefiniteness under §112(b), examiners make these more-often-than-not in the first non-final office action. For written description and enablement under §112(a), the pattern flips: final rejection rates exceed first non-final rates.

Section 112(b) indefiniteness rejection rates: first non-final vs final office actions, 2008-2025

Section 112(a) written description and enablement rejection rates: first non-final vs final office actions, 2008-2025

The §112(b) gap is consistent with the standard prosecution workflow. Examiners flag indefiniteness problems on the first office action. Applicants then amend claims to tighten-up the scope, and many of those problems are resolved before the application reaches a final rejection. Indefiniteness is, in this sense, often a “drafting fixable” defect. This is not absolutely true since applicants might add new problems through amendment, or examiners might notice the problem later in time.

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Amazon as Prior Art: The Rise in Design Patent §102 Rejections

by Dennis Crouch

Design patent prosecution has changed substantially over the past decade.  One place we see that is in the anticipation rejection rate. Among US-domestic design patents that actually issued, the share that received at least one §102 rejection during prosecution climbed from roughly 0.1% in 2008 to above 7% in early 2025. The rate has pulled back slightly under Director Squires to around 5-6%, but even at that level it sits at the highest sustained figure ever recorded. For practitioners who learned design prosecution in an era when prior art rejections were a relative rarity, that shift represents a fundamentally different examination environment.

Design Patent Grants — % Receiving ≥1 §102 / §103 Rejection Before Grant (US-domestic series-29; granted-only)

The chart here shows the percentage of granted U.S. design patents that received at least one §102 or §103 rejection during prosecution, grouped by grant date. Granted patents only; abandoned applications are not reflected because the bulk of design patents (the U.S. originated ones) are kept secret and never published.

In a prior post, I looked at U.S. design patent applications that came through the Hague System (series-35); and the data here for series-29 applications is roughly the same for obviousness rejections - showing no post-LKQ rise.  Dennis Crouch, Prior Art Rejection Rates in Design Patent Prosecution, Patently-O (May 2026).  But, the domestic cases show a much higher rate of §102 anticipation rejections than what I found in Hague cases. I don't have a definitive explanation for it, but the most plausible hypothesis tracks the Amazon story that I dig into below.  Most of the rise in anticipation rejections has come from searches of US-facing marketplace platforms - Amazon.com in particular.  Those searches return results that reflect products already in the US consumer market. Domestic applicants are more likely to have their products listed on Amazon before or around the time of filing. Hague applicants skew heavily foreign, and foreign-originated goods may not yet have a US market presence at the time of examination, or may distribute through platforms like Alibaba that examiners are not searching.  Ultimately this means that U.S. originated cases may be receiving a more rigorous examination than their foreign counterparts.


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Polar Electro’s New § 101 Cert Petition: When Courts Do the Challenger’s Job

by Dennis Crouch

Two Finnish sports-tech companies have been litigating U.S. Patent No. 6,537,227 in a Utah federal court since 2017. Polar Electro Oy — the heart rate monitor maker — owns the patent, which claims a process for estimating energy expenditure during exercise by combining a measured heart rate with a personalized physiological reference value tied to VO2max. Firstbeat Technologies Oy, a physiological analytics company acquired by Garmin in 2020, moved for summary judgment of patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 but, according to the record, supplied no prior art, no expert testimony, and no developed conventionality theory. The district court granted the motion anyway, assembling its own analysis from the prosecution history. The Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion (Rule 36). Polar is now asking the Supreme Court to take up three big questions. Polar Electro Oy v. Firstbeat Technologies Oy, No. 25-1268 (U.S. petition filed May 2026).

Questions:

  • Whether a court may construct its own invalidity argument — independently identifying evidence and assembling rationales — when the challenger raised the defense but failed to support it, especially given § 282's presumption of validity and the clear-and-convincing standard.
  • Whether a process that takes a real-world physiological input and uses it within an improved procedure to produce a more accurate technological result remains eligible under Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
  • Whether the judicially created exceptions for abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are impermissible judicial legislation the Court should overrule in favor of the statutory text.

The first question is the most legally ripe; the last is the most ambitious; the middle is the one the Court has repeatedly declined to resolve.


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After LKQ: The Boilerplate Changed; The Rejection Rate Did Not

by Dennis Crouch

In a recent post, I shared a chart showing that the §103 rejection rate for design patent applications has stayed flat in the two years since LKQ Corp. v. GM Global Technology Operations LLC, 102 F.4th 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (en banc). Through Hague System disposals, only about 1% of design applications receive an obviousness rejection. That is roughly where the rate sat a decade ago, and a long way from what one might expect given the Federal Circuit's decision enabling more rigorous obviousness analysis. I wanted to dig into a handful of cases to see any difference from pre- and post-LKQ obviousness rejections.  Examiners have adapted their language and are also using prior art that would not have worked with the old Rosen framework, just not on a very aggressive basis.  It may be, as readers suggested, that examiners would do more if given more time to search.

For this study, I compared the text of about 150 pre-LKQ obviousness rejections (2023) against about 150 post-LKQ obviousness rejections (January 2025 through April 2026).  As you might expect, examiners are no longer citing Rosen or other pre-LKQ decisions.  80% of pre-LKQ case cited to Rosen or an equivalent case, with 0% of post-LKQ rejections. "Basically the same," the verbal marker of the Rosen primary-reference test and the Durling-era phrase "so related" both almost entirely fell off from the rejection text.

What replaced the old framework were a set of post-LKQ phrases: "visually similar" (0% → 90%) and "overall appearance" (40% → 75%) now dominate. Oddly, LKQ itself rarely cited (only 4% of rejections) and KSR is at 0%. Almost 90% of post-LKQ §103 rejections cite no obviousness precedent at all.

I worked through several rejections in detail to see whether examiners are pushing into prior art that the old framework would have blocked. Some are. Aristocrat's slot-machine GUI was rejected over a structurally different primary, and TOPPAN's curved-glass panel was rejected over a utility patent combined with four NPL web URLs.  But, the most aggressive single-reference stretch that I saw in the dataset is actually pre-LKQ: Apple's over-ear headphone rejected under Rosen-Durling over a Monster Cable in-ear earbud.


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Twice Ambiguous: Actelion v. Mylan and the Contextual Reading of pH 13

by Dennis Crouch

Ask a lay person what pH 13 means and you will get a straightforward answer: very basic, near the top of the 14-point scale. Ask a PhD patent attorney in a Hatch-Waxman dispute the same question and the answer becomes: it depends.

The Federal Circuit's decision in Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 2024-1641 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2026), affirmed a finding of non-infringement that required refence to extrinsic evidence to understand the meaning of the claim term "pH of 13 or higher."  The problem is that the solution's pH varied depending upon whether taken at standard ambient temperature or instead at the temperature of the bulk solution during manufacture.

The same claim construction dispute was before the court in 2023. In that case, the court vacated the district court's first claim construction and remanded with instructions that extrinsic evidence had to be consulted before a proper construction could be reached. Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 85 F.4th 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2023).

That first appeal raised a different latent ambiguity in the same claim phrase: how many significant figures does "13" carry? The current appeal raises the temperature question. The pairing is methodologically instructive. The phrase ("pH of 13") carried two distinct contextual ambiguities.  And, despite the primacy of the claims and specification in the claim construction process, both ultimately required extrinsic evidence to resolve. The decision also rejected Actelion's doctrine of equivalents theory on two independent grounds, prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure-dedication rule. That makes Actelion the second DOE rejection from the Federal Circuit this week, following Bissell, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Nos. 2024-1509 & 2024-1709 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2026).


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Micro-Entity Traps for Inventors Who Also Own Their Employer

by Dennis Crouch

The micro-entity discount created by Congress in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act represents one of patent law's more generous gestures toward independent inventors. Under 35 U.S.C. § 123, applicants who qualify pay only 20% of the standard USPTO filing fees.  But the statute comes with a precise set of eligibility requirements, and inventors who miscalculate their status face stiff consequences.  A Federal Circuit decision issued today, Nesarikar v. USPTO, No. 2026-1167 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2026) (nonprecedential), illustrates the traps.

  • An administrative trap involves a misapplication of the § 123(b) prior-employment exception to the application-filing limit.
  • A litigation trap involves what happened when the inventors tried to challenge that denial in court and discovered that the representations they made to the USPTO in support of micro-entity status had stripped them of Article III standing to sue.

The three Nesarikar inventors — Ashlesha, Anika, and Abhijit — are joint inventors on a portfolio of patent applications covering AI-based systems for autonomous vehicles. Their U.S. Patent Application No. 18/069,288, titled "Systems and Methods for Intelligent Awareness and Intent for Autonomous Vehicles" and claiming priority to a December 2021 provisional, was filed on December 21, 2022, along with seven sibling applications filed the same day.

All three inventors certified micro-entity status for the '288 application and paid the corresponding discounted fees. In April 2024, the USPTO sent a notice of payment deficiency, informing the Nesarikars that their micro-entity certification appeared to be in error, with each of the three being named on 10+ prior patent applications. The inventors responded by invoking the § 123(b) prior-employment exception, asserting that they were obligated to assign their prior applications — and the '288 application itself — to former employers. The Office found these representations unsupported and refused to accept them as sufficient. After a series of exchanges that resolved nothing, the '288 application was abandoned in February 2025. The Nesarikars then filed a pro se lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas under the Administrative Procedure Act, which the district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Federal Circuit has now affirmed that dismissal.


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Remains Disabled: How a Firmware Rewrite Defeated Bissell’s ITC Exclusion Order

by Dennis Crouch

When a patent holder wins a Section 337 investigation at the International Trade Commission, the victory comes with a caveat: a limited exclusion order bars the specific infringing products, not whatever the respondent ships next. A sophisticated respondent facing an exclusion order (or anticipating one) will redesign.

Sometimes that redesign is a substantial engineering effort, but in our current world it is most often accomplished through a firmware software update.  The Federal Circuit's decision in Bissell, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Nos. 2024-1509 & 2024-1709 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2026), provides an example.

The dispute involves wet/dry floor cleaner that automatically flushes the brushroll when docked. Bissell's patent includes a caveat - that the battery charging circuit "is disabled by the actuation of the self-cleaning mode input control and remains disabled during the unattended automatic cleanout cycle." U.S. Patent No. 11,076,735.  After Bissell filed its Section 337 complaint against Chinese manufacturer Tineco in March 2022, Tineco rewrote the code for its accused Floor One S3 and S5 Pro devices. The redesigned firmware altered the timing of the 120-second cleanout cycle so that the battery charging circuit activates twice during the cycle, briefly at the outset and again toward the middle, rather than staying off throughout.

The timing diagram above shows this visually - adding in those two brief charge cycles. This is a easy technical work-around - the momentary charging is a meaningless addition that avoids literal infringement. This case looks to me to be the exact situation that doctrine of equivalents was designed to address, but the ITC rejected the the equivalents argument.  Ultimately, the ITC found Tineco's original products infringed, entered a limited exclusion order against them. But, it found no infringement as to the redesigned ones.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed everything.


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Prior Art Rejection Rates in Design Patent Prosecution

by Dennis Crouch

We saw a huge change in our U.S. Design Patent system two years ago. In May 2024, the Federal Circuit decided LKQ v. GM, and ushering in a flexible obviousness test. The prior test was both rigid and restrictive and very few design patent applications were ever rejected as obvious. The new test opens the door to more rigorous obviousness examination. But, as the chart shows below, that is not happening. The fact remains that only about 1% of applications receive an obviousness rejection.

For this analysis, I use Hague System cases because those file wrappers are public unlike ordinary design patent application files. The Hague agreement allows applicants to file a single international design application that can designate multiple countries, including the United States. This is PCT for design patents. In the U.S., Hague System applications are examined under the same substantive standards as domestic design patent applications.


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